Arab World Divided on October 7 Attack, New Study Reveals

A new study by the research group "Psychological Warfare" indicates a deepening rift within the Arab world regarding the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. While Hamas continues to frame the assault as a historic victory, a growing number of Palestinians question whether armed struggle has benefited them. The research, published on the group's Telegram channel, analyzed opinion polls, Arab media, political statements, and social media discussions. It found two competing narratives emerging: one celebrating October 7 as a symbol of "resistance" that shattered Israel's invincibility and refocused global attention on the Palestinian issue, and another viewing it as a catastrophic miscalculation that led to Gaza's destruction and weakened Palestinian political standing.

Initially, many in the Arab world expressed elation over Israel's perceived vulnerability. This view persists among Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Hamas, on its third anniversary, reiterated its portrayal of the attack as a pivotal moment, emphasizing its symbolic breakthrough and regional impact, without acknowledging the devastating consequences for Gaza. However, even within this camp, the distinction between symbolic victory and actual strategic gain is becoming apparent. While the attack altered the Middle East agenda, its success in achieving Hamas's war aims or improving the Palestinian situation is increasingly debatable. A Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) poll from August 2026 found only 20% of Palestinians believed Hamas won the war, down from 39% in October 2025.

Conversely, a narrative portraying the attack as a political decision with unforeseen consequences is gaining traction. Critics argue Hamas initiated a war without a realistic plan, prioritizing its own interests and those of regional allies over Gazan safety. Arab publications critical of Hamas increasingly use terms like "adventure," "recklessness," and "catastrophe," with some likening it to a "second Nakba." A significant line of criticism focuses on an armed organization, influenced by Iran, unilaterally deciding on war. This discourse is particularly visible in Lebanese and Saudi media, among Palestinian opposition factions, and in Gaza residents' comments. Some Lebanese publications noted that the tactical success of October 7 quickly turned into a strategic and political failure. Critiques of Hamas do not necessarily absolve Israel of responsibility for destruction and civilian deaths, but rather argue that Hamas leadership is also accountable for the decision to attack.

The study also highlights a crisis of trust in existing Palestinian leadership. While Hamas support has declined, it has not automatically translated to increased support for Fatah or the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas. The August 2026 PCPSR poll showed both Hamas and Fatah with around 24% support, while 44% believed neither deserved to lead. Furthermore, 84% of Palestinians favored Abbas's resignation, and a significant majority desired elections or new leadership, indicating a broader crisis of political representation rather than a simple shift between parties. Fatah representative Majid Faraj called on Hamas to apologize for the catastrophe, a demand Hamas rejected, insisting on a broader historical context for discussing responsibility, especially with upcoming elections.

Crucially, criticism of armed struggle does not equate to a willingness to disarm. While 65% of Gazans in the August 2026 PCPSR poll agreed that armed resistance had not protected Palestinians and led to destruction, 62% opposed Hamas disarming before a full Israeli withdrawal. Similarly, 72% of Palestinians overall held this view. This paradox suggests that while the utility of armed struggle is questioned, the fear of relinquishing a bargaining chip before political conditions are met remains strong. In Gaza, Hamas support in August 2026 was 33%, down from 41% ten months prior, while on the West Bank it was 18%. Researchers suggest this indicates a potential for a more pragmatic approach, but not necessarily an acceptance of any terms.

Arab media coverage is increasingly shifting from the October 7 attack itself to the three-year war in Gaza, focusing on destruction, casualties, and displacement. Figures cited from Gaza's health ministry and UN-World Bank-EU assessments detail significant loss of life and infrastructure damage. While suffering in Gaza is widely reported, even by outlets critical of Hamas, explicit sympathy for Israeli victims remains rare. The debate over violence against civilians on October 7 continues, with Hamas-affiliated sources denying allegations of civilian killings and sexual violence. The study notes that declining support for Hamas does not automatically lead to broader acknowledgment of Israeli suffering.

Arab governments like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE prioritize regional stability, supporting Palestinian rights and a two-state solution but advocating for a ceasefire, reconstruction, and controlled governance, rather than glorifying "resistance." Their approach focuses on political settlement and reconstruction, not necessarily aligning with Israel's position but differing in methods. Public support for normalization with Israel remains low across most Arab nations, generally below 25%, with Egypt and Jordan showing around 4%. However, this opposition may soften if normalization is linked to the recognition of a Palestinian state. The study cautions against equating public demonstrations with overall societal sentiment or assuming government policy completely ignores public opinion, noting that diplomatic and public attitudes can operate on separate planes.

Disappointment is also growing regarding Iran's "unity of fronts" strategy, with critics questioning whether Hamas's decision served Palestinian interests or Iran's broader regional calculations. This narrative suggests Iran used the Palestinian issue to bolster its own position without fully sharing the war's cost with Gaza. While less prevalent than criticism of Hamas's miscalculation, this perspective is gaining weight among non-Islamist Palestinians, anti-Hezbollah Lebanese circles, and in Saudi polemics against Tehran. Social media discussions are intense, with organized waves of publications and coordinated content sharing observed, though the study found no technical evidence of bot networks. The research concludes that the third anniversary does not represent a unified Arab condemnation of Hamas, but rather a complex shift in discourse where symbolic interpretations clash with assessments of outcomes, public sympathy for Palestinians is distinct from trust in their leaders, and the desire for peace coexists with reluctance to abandon armed leverage.