New Details Emerge on Warnings to Netanyahu Before Oct. 7 Hamas Attack

An investigation has uncovered previously unknown details of communications between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and military leadership in the months leading up to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, suggesting he received security warnings about escalating risks. New documents and testimonies from former high-ranking officials challenge claims that the political leadership was unaware of growing threats, though they do not confirm specific dates or scenarios of the attack. The findings, reported by Israelinfo and based on military documents and meeting protocols, reveal the content of warnings issued to Netanyahu throughout 2023 and highlight discrepancies in accounts from those involved.

According to documents presented by Channel 12 journalist Yaron Avraham, then-IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi warned Netanyahu on March 21, 2023, about the potential consequences of Israel's internal political crisis, stating that adversaries perceived the country's divisions as weakness, which could prompt offensive actions. Halevi requested a special meeting with senior military command, which Channel 12 reported did not occur. A subsequent warning on July 23 from Halevi again highlighted the weakening of Israeli deterrence. Netanyahu reportedly responded by attributing the situation to participants in protests against the judicial reform, saying, "It's not us! Let them talk to those on Kaplan."

Further warnings included a seven-page letter from then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on September 7, exactly one month before the attack, detailing the increasing danger of military escalation. These documents primarily focused on strategic threats and the possibility of a multi-front conflict, rather than a specific attack from Gaza. Former military secretary Avi Gil confirmed to Channel 12 that Netanyahu received war warnings but stated he had no information about the specific October 7 attack. Gil also mentioned that some proposals from intelligence services to eliminate Hamas leaders were not approved by the prime minister and that he possesses 16 notebooks of meeting records intended for a future state commission.

Netanyahu's office maintains that he received no warnings of an impending Hamas invasion from Gaza, asserting that intelligence and security chiefs considered Hamas to be deterred and did not anticipate a large-scale attack. However, an investigation by Ronen Bergman and Yuval Rubowitz in Yedioth Ahronoth found inconsistencies between Netanyahu's responses to the state comptroller and original intelligence documents, suggesting selective use of information, including regarding intelligence warnings and the "Jericho Wall" attack plan known to Israeli intelligence. The investigation acknowledges that while strategic warnings were received, they did not necessarily prove the political leadership had reliable information on the timing and method of the attack.

New publications also raise questions about the role of former IDF leaders. Former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, who served from 2015 to 2019, had publicly stated in 2017 that Hamas was deterred, despite its military potential, during a period when military intelligence received early versions of a large-scale invasion plan. Reserve Major General Yitzhak Brick had warned since 2018 about serious deficiencies in ground forces' readiness and military infrastructure, which he claimed were exacerbated by army reforms. Eisenkot, who initiated an internal review that found the army ready for war despite identifying significant shortcomings, later acknowledged his share of responsibility. Former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman also stated he disagreed with intelligence assessments of Hamas's intentions and repeatedly warned military leadership, ultimately leaving his post due to serious disagreements, though he admitted failing to convince leadership to change their approach.

Despite numerous publications, Israel has not yet established a state investigative commission to comprehensively examine the circumstances of the Hamas attack. Such a commission would have the authority to request classified documents, review closed meeting protocols, and compare testimonies. The published materials indicate that warnings about deteriorating security situations did reach the highest political levels, but the crucial questions remain about the specific information available to Israeli leadership, how its credibility was assessed, and what decisions were made.