Israel's Electoral Math: The Perils and Promises of Surplus Vote Agreements
Translated & summarized from Calcalist by baba
Otzma Yehudit, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, is the only party that has not yet signed a surplus vote agreement, facing a dilemma with potential electoral consequences. Historically, these agreements have been complex and sometimes detrimental, though a 1973 law now prevents them from causing a party to lose a mandate. While modern agreements are less risky, they can still influence seat allocation and carry reputational implications. Globally, many countries have moved away from surplus vote agreements due to concerns about fairness and representation.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Otzma Yehudit is the only party without a surplus vote agreement, facing electoral risks.
- A 1973 law prevents surplus vote pacts from causing parties to lose Knesset seats.
- Historically, surplus vote agreements have sometimes led to unintended seat losses for parties.
- Modern agreements can still impact seat allocation and carry reputational risks.
- Many countries, including France and the Netherlands, have abolished surplus vote agreements.
Otzma Yehudit, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, is the only party clearly exceeding the electoral threshold that has not yet signed a surplus vote agreement for the upcoming elections. This leaves Ben-Gvir in a difficult position, with his primary option being a pact with Ofer Winter's Am Israel Hayehudi party, a direct competitor. Signing with Winter would legitimize his candidacy, but not signing could cost the right-wing bloc a Knesset seat. Historically, surplus vote agreements have been complex, sometimes leading to unintended consequences. In the 1969 elections, the "Kidma VeFituaḥ" party lost a mandate due to its agreement with a satellite Arab list, with the seat going to the right-wing Free Center party. This risk led many parties to avoid such pacts in earlier years. The Bader-Ofer law, enacted in 1973, changed the surplus vote calculation to favor larger parties, making it impossible for a surplus vote agreement to cause a party to lose a mandate. This law, however, has not eliminated all risks associated with these agreements.
Despite the Bader-Ofer law, surplus vote agreements can still have strategic implications. In 2003, the National Religious Party (NRP) signed with the smaller, left-leaning One Israel party, gaining a sixth seat. They preferred this agreement over one with the ideologically closer but much larger Likud party. Conversely, Shinui, led by Tommy Lapid, signed with the Green party in the same election, which failed to pass the electoral threshold, resulting in Shinui receiving 15 mandates instead of 16. For long-standing partners like Shas and United Torah Judaism, Shas historically had a double chance of winning the shared mandate. Agreements can also carry reputational risks, potentially 'staining' a party with ideological associations. In 2013, Shelly Yachimovich of the Labor Party broke tradition by signing with Yesh Atid instead of Meretz, a move seen as an attempt to distance herself from the left. In 2019, Avigdor Lieberman's agreement with Benny Gantz's Blue and White was framed by the Likud as a defection to the change bloc.
Globally, surplus vote agreements are becoming less common. France reformed its electoral system in 1958, and the Netherlands abolished its system in 2017, deeming vote transfers a form of voter deception. Brazil eliminated its system in 2020, as it allowed very small parties to enter parliament. The article also touches upon historical instances of surplus vote agreements involving Arab parties and satellite lists, noting that in 1973, the Likud signed with an "Israeli Arab list" that did not pass the threshold, and Mapai signed with the Democratic List for Israeli Arabs in 1955. In 2015, the Joint List refused to sign with Meretz, viewing it as a Zionist party.
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