Israel Faces Deep Strategic Failures Three Years After Hamas Attack
Translated & summarized from Mida by baba
Three years after the Hamas attack, Israel has not achieved decisive victory, with Hamas still operational and rearming. The article criticizes a lack of serious military plans to defeat Hamas or Hezbollah, and highlights fundamental failures in force buildup, doctrine, and strategic planning. Critical shortages in equipment and a neglected reserve force persist, while future threats from groups like a Syrian jihadist army and the Egyptian military are overlooked. The author concludes that a severe leadership crisis, with all current options sharing responsibility, prevents necessary corrections.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Israel has not achieved decisive victory three years after the Hamas attack, with Hamas remaining operational.
- The IDF never implemented a serious military plan to decisively defeat Hamas or Hezbollah.
- Fundamental failures in force buildup, doctrine, and strategic planning have left the IDF unprepared.
- Critical shortages in equipment and a neglected reserve force persist, requiring foreign aid.
- Future threats from a Syrian jihadist army and the Egyptian military are overlooked in Israeli planning.
- A severe leadership crisis exists, with all current alternatives sharing responsibility for strategic failures.
Three years after the deadly Hamas attack that plunged Israel into war, the country is far from recovered, decisive, or prepared for future conflicts, the article argues. Despite ongoing fighting on multiple fronts, a clear victory remains elusive, with Hamas still controlling Gaza militarily and administratively. While hostages have returned and significant damage has been inflicted on Gaza, the war's primary objective of defeating Hamas has not been met. Hamas continues to rearm and prepare for further conflict, and any Israeli gains in Gaza are considered temporary.
The author contends that Israel has never truly attempted to decisively defeat Hamas, with military operations described as raids or temporary land seizures rather than efforts to destroy the organization. Key areas of Gaza were never entered by the IDF, and no comprehensive plan for occupying the Strip and defeating Hamas existed before or during the war. This failure is attributed to a deep-seated strategic flaw and a continued adherence to outdated strategic concepts.
The situation in the north is similarly assessed, with the IDF achieving some successes against Hezbollah, such as the elimination of its leader and the dismantling of its missile array. However, Hezbollah remains operational, is rebuilding, and is even outpacing the IDF in adapting to the battlefield. The article notes that the objectives in the north were initially more modest, focusing on returning residents and damaging Hezbollah's rocket capabilities, which, while met, are seen as evidence of limited capacity rather than a major success.
The article criticizes the IDF's fundamental unpreparedness, not just in intelligence failures but in core issues of force buildup, doctrine, and strategic planning. This includes a military that is too small, a neglected reserve force, and critical shortages in essential equipment and ammunition, necessitating significant foreign aid. The author asserts that these issues remain largely unaddressed, with the ground forces still too small and local munition production insufficient.
Looking ahead, the article warns of potentially more dangerous future threats, including a jihadist army being built in Syria and the Egyptian army's ongoing armament. These are seen as more strategic threats than Hamas or Hezbollah, yet are largely ignored in Israeli strategic planning. The piece concludes by highlighting a severe leadership crisis, arguing that all current leadership alternatives share responsibility for the failures in force buildup and strategic planning, thus hindering any possibility of correction.
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