IDF Defense Line Collapsed in Under 90 Minutes on Oct. 7, Says Retired General

Retired Brigadier General Guy Chazut, former commander of the Red Division and head of the ground forces' operational learning system after October 7, stated that the collapse of the IDF's defense line on October 7, 2023, was not solely an issue with the Gaza Division but a systemic failure across all decision-making levels. Chazut, speaking as part of a special project by Kan News, explained that his initial post-October 7 investigation, titled "How the Gaza Division Was Defeated," was met with skepticism by a senior Southern Command officer who suggested, "It wasn't the Gaza Division that was defeated, the State of Israel was defeated." Chazut now agrees with this assessment, attributing the failure to a multi-year strategic decline.

Chazut argued that Israel failed to adapt its security doctrine to evolving threats. While the threat of invasion by Arab armies diminished after the Yom Kippur War, Israel focused on terrorism and rocket fire. However, he noted that Hamas and Hezbollah built forces capable of large-scale incursions into Israel, with units like the "Nukhba" and "Radwan" designed to seize Israeli territory. Chazut asserted that the political echelon, including the government and cabinet led by the Prime Minister, should have updated the defense concept to reflect these new threats and directed the military accordingly, but instead continued a policy of containment and deterrence rather than decisive action.

The second failure, according to Chazut, occurred at the systemic level within the General Staff and commands, which did not adequately address Hamas's ability to transition from routine to attack within hours. He cited the rapid mobilization of 1,500 operatives on the night of October 6, with the raid commencing by 6:00 AM, as an example of an abnormal situation that warranted war. This, he stated, points to blame on both the strategic and systemic levels.

The third failure was at the tactical level, where Chazut described "unfathomable failures" stemming from years of deterioration. He explained that military camps, intended to be fortified positions, were instead treated as rear bases, with insufficient resources allocated to proper defense construction. This, combined with poor alert readiness and low combat fitness, made the area easy for Hamas to penetrate. Chazut highlighted the speed of the collapse, noting that by 8:00 AM on October 7, the Gaza envelope was under Hamas control, with the organization dominating roads, junctions, settlements, and most IDF camps.

Chazut emphasized that the core problem is not a lack of offensive capability or resources but a fundamental issue of "organizational culture." He stated, "No matter what strategy you have, in the end, organizational culture eats strategy for breakfast." He believes that until these failures are acknowledged by both the military and political echelons, they cannot be rectified, and a comprehensive recovery plan, potentially involving external input, is necessary for the IDF.