Ex-PM Official Explains Why Netanyahu Wasn't Woken on Oct. 7

Eli Groner, former Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, explained in a special project by Kan News that the focus on whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was woken on the night of October 7th misses the main point. Groner stated that a prevailing consensus among the political and security leadership believed Hamas did not seek war and that the policy should be to "maintain" the organization. "Whether he was woken or not doesn't matter. There was a widespread conception for many years," Groner said, dismissing the attempt to focus the discussion on the fact the Prime Minister was not alerted.

Groner noted that Netanyahu habitually goes to sleep very late, so calls at 1 or 2 AM would typically be before he slept. However, he deferred questions about waking the Prime Minister at 4, 5, or 6 AM to the Military Secretary. He emphasized that despite alleged warnings to the Prime Minister from the IDF and Shin Bet, the military's readiness level did not change significantly, remaining at a holiday alert with most personnel at home. "After 18 years of hearing false alarms from the security establishment, you take it much less seriously," Groner commented.

Groner stressed that responsibility is not solely on the security establishment, acknowledging "many guilty parties" but stating that the entire security system and the Prime Minister believed in the conception of maintaining Hamas. He added that anyone who challenged this view was silenced or ridiculed. Groner asserted that Netanyahu also explicitly supported the policy of maintaining Hamas, believing it had worked effectively for 15 years until October 7th.

He suggested that Netanyahu's extensive experience might have worked against him, making him less likely to take warnings seriously after years of perceived false alarms. Groner also linked the situation to the judicial reform crisis and the resulting friction between Netanyahu and security officials. He argued that when security chiefs warned Netanyahu about the implications of the civilian policy, their influence diminished, leading him to disregard their concerns.

Groner further posited that the ongoing normalization talks with Saudi Arabia, which Netanyahu saw as a potential legacy-defining achievement, might have led him to dismiss concerns about Gaza as trivial. He concluded that understanding the context of both the normalization efforts and the judicial reform crisis is crucial to comprehending the events leading up to the attack.