Israel's Security Flaws Exposed After FlyDubai Crew Attack
Translated & summarized from Cursorinfo by baba
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Israel's security system has a major gap in vetting foreign commercial airline crews.
- The issue was highlighted after a co-pilot attacked the captain on a FlyDubai flight to Israel.
- Private pilots face strict background checks, unlike commercial flight crews.
- Previous warnings about vetting issues were reportedly dismissed by the National Security Council.
- Authorities are now working to define clear responsibilities for crew vetting.
- The Ministry of Transport lacks the intelligence capabilities for individual crew screening.
A significant security gap in the vetting of foreign airline crews has been revealed in Israel following an incident on a FlyDubai flight. While private pilots undergo rigorous background checks, including biographical reviews, commercial flights rely heavily on airlines and foreign security services for crew vetting. This issue came to light after a co-pilot on a FlyDubai flight to Israel, identified as Hamam al-Hammami, an Omani citizen, attacked the captain. Israeli authorities are now investigating how he was cleared for the flight and who was responsible for his background check.
Concerns about the vetting of pilots from Egypt and Jordan were raised as early as 2018 by the Ministry of Transport's security unit, which proposed stricter standards. However, the National Security Council rejected this initiative at the time. The State Comptroller also identified shortcomings in data handling two years ago. In contrast, Israel enforces much stricter protocols for private aviation, requiring companies to submit detailed pilot information three days prior to flights, which has led to flight denials for individuals with past travel to hostile countries like Iraq.
For commercial flights, Israel typically reviews the airline's general security procedures and the country's overall safety standards, granting flight permissions without individually vetting each crew member. The Ministry of Transport cited a lack of intelligence capabilities to screen hundreds of foreigners on every flight, stating that intervention only occurs if specific suspicious information emerges. Following the attack, it was discovered that FlyDubai had assured Israel in 2020 about adhering to crew citizenship restrictions, but Israel lacked a mechanism to verify these claims before each flight.
The problem extends beyond FlyDubai, as foreign airlines may employ crew members from various nationalities, potentially including those from countries hostile to Israel. The current system hinders Israeli agencies from reliably identifying the crew of arriving aircraft in advance. The incident has also prompted questions about which agency holds responsibility for such checks. The Ministry of Transport stated it is not an intelligence agency and lacks overseas capabilities, attributing aviation intelligence to the Mossad and Shin Bet, with the Shin Bet handling Israeli and charter flights, and the Mossad overseeing foreign airlines.
Despite a 2023 law mandating a system for collecting passenger and crew data for relevant agencies, the dedicated center has not yet become fully operational. Aviation expert Yossi Fisher commented that the issue is broader than the FlyDubai incident, emphasizing the need for Israeli authorities to also monitor who is on incoming flight crews. Moving forward, authorities must establish clear inter-agency responsibilities for vetting foreign crews and identifying potential threats before flights arrive in Israel.
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