Netanyahu's Pre-Oct. 7 Directives Contradict Public Statements, Investigation Finds

An investigative report by Ronen Bergman and Yuval Rubowicz for Yedioth Ahronoth's "7 Days" magazine reveals significant discrepancies between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's current accounts of his directives before the October 7th Hamas attack and official documents from his office.

The second part of the investigation, following an earlier piece on military and intelligence agencies, focuses on the National Security Council, the government, and the Prime Minister himself. A key finding is the divergence between Netanyahu's public statements and recorded instructions concerning Qatar's funding of Hamas, "humanitarian" policies towards Gaza, and operational readiness against Hamas leadership.

According to the report, intelligence agencies had warned since at least 2019 that Qatari funds flowing into Gaza were not solely for civilian needs but also for Hamas's military buildup, potentially funding up to 50% of its military wing's budget. Netanyahu's office has consistently denied receiving information about these funds being used for terror, stating they were for specific civilian purposes. However, the investigators claim to possess evidence contradicting this, including intelligence assessments from 2019 and 2021 indicating significant diversion of Qatari funds to Hamas's military wing, under codenames like "Sparkling Crystal" and "Panther's Eye."

Documents from September 27 and October 1, 2023, attributed to Netanyahu's office, outline directives that appear to contradict his later public narrative. On October 1, just six days before the attack, directives included "intensifying the use" of humanitarian benefits based on Hamas's behavior, "advancing civilian settlement with Hamas," and "advancing operational readiness for recommended assassinations." The report emphasizes that the directive regarding assassinations focused on "readiness" and "emergency situations," not immediate execution, and was described as "recommended" rather than a direct order.

In contrast, Netanyahu's 55-page submission to the State Comptroller presented a different picture, portraying himself as advocating for deterrence and weakening Hamas, including eliminating its leadership, while blaming security forces for prioritizing agreements with Hamas. The investigative documents, however, suggest Netanyahu himself instructed the advancement of civilian settlement and humanitarian measures, while assassination orders were framed as preparations rather than immediate actions. The report also highlights discrepancies regarding statements from then-Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, whose full remarks about a potential offensive plan were allegedly omitted or misrepresented in the Prime Minister's office's published excerpts.

The investigation concludes that while the documents do not establish a direct causal link between specific decisions and the October 7th attack, they reveal a complex reality where humanitarian policies and operational readiness were simultaneously pursued, contradicting Netanyahu's simplified public account and raising questions about his responsibility and the accuracy of his post-attack explanations.