IDF Probe Finds Failures in Gaza Border Base Defense on Oct. 7

An Israeli military investigation into the battle at the Foga outpost on October 7 has revealed significant failures in preparedness and response, nearly three years after the Hamas attack. The findings indicate that forces at the Foga outpost were not adequately prepared for the defense mission on the morning of the attack and failed to prevent the outpost's capture and the infiltration of terrorists into Kibbutz Be'eri.

According to the probe, training and readiness at the outpost, which was intended to be a fortified combat position, had primarily focused on riot control near the border fence in the period before the war. On October 7, between 60 and 80 terrorists attacked the outpost area in three to four waves, with 11 infiltration routes identified in the battalion's sector. During the battle, 18 soldiers and commanders were killed, 22 were wounded, and two bodies were abducted to the Gaza Strip.

The Foga outpost housed a company from the Golani Brigade's 13th Battalion, along with a tank platoon, a mortar team, and armored vehicles. Shortly after the initial rocket barrage at 6:29 AM, the tanks were among the first targets hit. One tank commander, Sergeant Shai Levinson, eliminated approximately ten terrorists before being killed, and his body was taken to Gaza. Terrorists breached the outpost around 7:00 AM.

For hours, a platoon commander led the defense until he and another soldier fell while providing cover. Later, soldiers and the wounded were concentrated in the fortified dining hall, which terrorists surrounded. In the afternoon, terrorists set mattresses ablaze to choke those inside with smoke. Five soldiers who left the dining hall to engage the enemy were killed.

Rescue forces did not arrive until after 4:00 PM, after the terrorists had already left the area. The investigation determined a lack of drills for responding to a large-scale raid and a shortage of basic weaponry, such as machine guns. A senior officer involved in the probe stated the force was unprepared for an attack of this magnitude.

Hamas's attack was staged, targeting tanks first, then observation posts, and finally the mortar complex and the outpost itself, neutralizing much of the sector's intelligence, fire, and defense capabilities early on. Air support was also limited, with only one of three strikes by the Air Force resulting in terrorist eliminations due to coordination and situational awareness gaps. The loss of the outpost's command echelon and the inability of the company commander to reach the sector severely hampered the battle's management. The investigation team concluded that despite the surprise and numerical disadvantage, the forces were expected to achieve a different outcome and defeat the terrorists.