IDF Combat Aftermath: Gaza Outpost Unprepared for Oct. 7 Attack
An IDF combat assessment revealed that forces stationed at the Pega outpost were unprepared for the Hamas attack on October 7, failing to prevent the outpost's capture and the subsequent infiltration into Kibbutz Be'eri. The investigation, released nearly three years after the attack, found that pre-war training and readiness focused primarily on riot control near the border, despite Pega being designed as a fortified combat position. Between 60 and 80 terrorists attacked the Pega area in three to four waves, with 11 infiltration routes identified in the broader divisional sector. The assault resulted in the deaths of 18 soldiers and commanders, with 22 wounded and two bodies abducted to Gaza.
A company from the Golani Brigade's 13th Battalion, along with a tank platoon, mortar team, and armored vehicles, was stationed at Pega. Shortly after the initial rocket barrage at 6:29 AM, the tanks, among the first targets, were hit. One tank commander, Sergeant Shai Levinson, eliminated approximately ten terrorists before being killed, and his body was taken to Gaza. Terrorists breached the outpost around 7:00 AM.
Despite the loss of command personnel, a platoon commander took charge and led the defense for hours until he and another soldier fell while covering their unit's movement. Remaining soldiers and the wounded concentrated in a fortified mess hall, which terrorists besieged and later set ablaze by igniting mattresses, attempting to suffocate those inside with smoke. Five soldiers who attempted to engage the attackers were killed.
Rescue forces did not arrive until after 4:00 PM, by which time the terrorists had already departed. The assessment concluded that insufficient drills were conducted for a large-scale raid, and the outpost lacked essential weaponry, including machine guns. "The force was not prepared for this scenario, for an attack on the outpost of this magnitude," stated a senior officer involved in the inquiry. Hamas's attack strategy involved a phased approach, targeting tanks first, then observation posts, and finally the mortar array and the outpost itself, neutralizing significant defensive and offensive capabilities early on.
Air support was limited, with the Air Force attempting intervention three times but only succeeding in eliminating terrorists in one instance, attributed to coordination, situational awareness, and communication gaps with ground forces. The loss of the outpost commander and other leaders severely impacted the command structure, preventing the company commander from reaching the sector. The investigation team concluded that despite the element of surprise and numerical disadvantage, the forces were expected to achieve a different outcome and at least neutralize the terrorists.
