Sources Reveal Hamas-Dahlan-Netanyahu Communication Channel

Israeli and Palestinian sources close to former Fatah official Mohammed Dahlan have shed light on a communication system involving messages passed from Hamas to Dahlan, and subsequently to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, according to a report in Haaretz newspaper. While details regarding any communication between Dahlan and bin Zayed remain unconfirmed, intelligence information was reportedly transferred in September 2023 from Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to Soufian Abu Zaida, a senior Fatah official and Dahlan associate described as "coal eyes" in the Haaretz investigation. This intelligence was then passed to Mohammed Dahlan and, shortly after, to Israel's Shin Bet security agency.

A senior Israeli intelligence official stated that the information received by the Shin Bet was not considered a warning, nor was it high-quality or operational intelligence, deeming it significantly inferior to intelligence gathered by Israel. This assessment, the official believes, explains why the information did not prompt action. The report also notes that the US administration is unaware of any concrete warning from the UAE prior to the October 7th attacks.

The Hamas-Dahlan-Shin Bet connection is not new. Abu Zaida has maintained long-term contact with senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad, with whom Netanyahu reportedly established a communication channel after the 2014 Gaza war. Simultaneously, Abu Zaida communicated with a senior Shin Bet official, identified only as "A," who previously headed the captives and missing persons division. Therefore, when the Shin Bet received intelligence from Abu Zaida, based on Sinwar, it was not perceived as an unusual event.

Sinwar's motive for providing intelligence that would eventually reach Israel is questioned, though the report suggests it may have been an attempt to create a false impression of willingness to negotiate. Two months before passing intelligence to Abu Zaida, Sinwar reportedly sent his deputy, Khalil al-Hayya, to Beirut to finalize the date of the October 7th massacre with Iranian officials. This effort by Sinwar is seen as part of a broader Hamas strategy, including approaching journalists and former officials over two years prior to the war, to lull Israel into a false sense of security while preparing for the attack. Hamas also sought to open mediation channels for missing persons, further contributing to a smokescreen for their operational preparations.