Hamas Intelligence Shared With Israel Via Fatah Official Before Oct. 7

Sources in Israel and close to prominent Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan have revealed details about intelligence messages Hamas conveyed to Dahlan, which were then reportedly passed on to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. While the extent of Dahlan's communication with bin Zayed remains unconfirmed, Israeli intelligence confirms that Yahya Sinwar, Hamas's leader in Gaza, transferred intelligence in September 2023 to Sufian Abu Zayda, a Fatah official close to Dahlan, referred to as "Coal Eyes" in an Israeli investigation. This information was relayed to Dahlan and, shortly after, to Israel's Shin Bet security agency.

An Israeli analyst suggested that Netanyahu's desire for normalization with Saudi Arabia and avoidance of a Gaza war led him to disregard warnings about Sinwar's plan. The exact actions Dahlan took with this intelligence are unclear. However, a senior Israeli intelligence official described the information reaching the Shin Bet as "not warning, qualitative, or operational" and significantly degraded in quality compared to intelligence gathered by Israel. This lack of quality, the official believes, prevented the agency from taking action.

The Hamas-Dahlan-Shin Bet connection is not new. Abu Zayda has long-standing ties with Hamas official Ghazi Hamad, with whom Netanyahu reportedly opened a communication channel after the 2014 Gaza war. Abu Zayda also maintains contact with a senior Shin Bet official, identified only as "A," who previously managed hostage and missing persons affairs. Therefore, the Shin Bet did not view the intelligence from Abu Zayda, based on Sinwar, as an unusual event.

This intelligence transfer raises the question of Sinwar's motives. The intelligence provided was not operationally significant but appears to have been an attempt to create a false impression of willingness to negotiate with Israel, similar to Hamas's long-term strategy before October 7. For instance, two months prior to sending the intelligence, Sinwar's deputy, Khalil al-Hayya, met with Iranian officials in Beirut to coordinate the October 7 attack date. Sinwar's actions are seen as part of a broader Hamas effort, including communication with journalists and former officials, to mislead Israel about its intentions and preparations for the October 7 attack, while simultaneously pursuing mediation channels for missing persons.

An intelligence official summarized the intelligence's low value, stating, "In short, this information was not about the chemical materials of Ashraf Marwan." The official added that a "perception swallowed all the evidence within it, and it is what killed us all."