Hamas Intelligence Transfer to Israel Before War Was Deception, Officials Say

Israeli officials and sources close to Palestinian official Mohammed Dahlan have shed light on communications between Hamas and Dahlan, which were allegedly relayed to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. While the extent of Dahlan's communication with bin Zayed remains unconfirmed, it is reported that in September 2023, Yahya Sinwar, Hamas's leader in Gaza, transferred "intelligence" information to Sufian Abu Zaida, a Fatah official and Dahlan associate. This information subsequently reached Dahlan and, with a short delay, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency).

A senior Israeli intelligence official described the information received by the Shin Bet as "not alert-generating, not high-quality, and not operational," stating it was inferior to intelligence gathered by Israel and therefore did not prompt action. The article notes that the Hamas-Dahlan-Shin Bet channel is not new, with Abu Zaida maintaining long-standing ties to Hamas official Ghazi Hamad and Shin Bet official Adi Rotem, who previously handled captive and missing persons affairs. This established connection meant the intelligence transfer was not perceived as unusual.

Sources close to Dahlan claim Sinwar provided information indicating a potential escalation in Gaza. However, the article posits that Sinwar's motive for sending intelligence that would reach Israel was part of a broader, prolonged deception campaign preceding the October 7th attacks. This campaign aimed to create a false impression of readiness for dialogue with Israel, while actual attack preparations were underway.

Further evidence of this deception includes Sinwar sending Khalil al-Hayya to Beirut two months prior to the intelligence transfer for meetings with Iranian officials to finalize the attack date. Israel has since identified a pattern of deceptive actions by Hamas over two years, including approaching journalists and former officials to "lull" Israel, portraying Sinwar as focused on civilian infrastructure, and initiating mediation efforts for hostages as a smokescreen for the planned massacre.

An Israeli intelligence official concluded that the intelligence was not significant, comparing it unfavorably to past intelligence operations, and attributed the failure to act on warning signs to a prevailing "conception" or mindset that blinded decision-makers.