Sinwar's Deception Plan Before October 7 Revealed in Captured Hamas Documents

Documents seized by Israeli intelligence and analyzed by the Amit Center, then shared with The Jerusalem Post, reveal how Hamas prepared politically and militarily in the years before the October 7 attack to make Israel believe it was deterred. The analysis covers six documents, three of which were cited in the report, and shows a steady process that began in 2022 and continued until just days before the surprise assault.

According to the documents, Hamas instructed operatives to keep building military outposts near the border at what would look like a routine pace, maintain regular training, and repeatedly summon Nukhba fighters in different ways. The goal was to wear down Israel's ability to distinguish normal activity from real attack preparations. Hamas also sought to increase its presence along the border, send senior commanders there, and turn unusual movement into something that appeared ordinary.

A major part of the deception, the Amit Center said, was Hamas's decision to stay out of several rounds of fighting between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although that made Hamas appear weaker in the short term, the group saw it as a worthwhile price for reinforcing the impression in Israel that it preferred economic concessions over war. One document said border protests and actions should continue until the organization's goals were achieved, but in a gradual and calculated way, including reducing pressure between September 25 and 27 so Israel would have time to react and engage with mediators before tensions were raised again.

The papers also said Hamas wanted to stop other armed groups from escalating the border too aggressively, so as not to weaken its control over the Palestinian narrative and what it called “the big project.” Alongside operational guidance, the documents urged messaging around al-Aqsa, security prisoners, Israeli activity in Judea and Samaria, lifting the naval blockade, freedom to work, freedom to leave Gaza, and access to medical treatment. Hamas also aimed to pressure countries including Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, and Kuwait, while promoting parliamentary activity and protests outside U.S. embassies to broaden support for ending the maritime blockade on Gaza. The documents suggest October 7 was not only a military operation, but also the result of a broad deception campaign designed to normalize suspicious border activity and hide Hamas's intent until the attack began.