Hamas Leader Sinwar’s Handwritten Documents Reveal Detailed Planning Behind October 7 Attack

Exclusive documents uncovered in Gaza, handwritten by Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and dated August 24, 2022, reveal the meticulous planning behind the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. The papers, exposed by the Amit Institute for Terror and Intelligence Studies, outline precise instructions for the operation, from weeks of deception before the assault to breaching Israeli territory and capturing civilians and soldiers. Sinwar’s plan called for seizing control of 25 junctions and over 220 communities, including kibbutzim and cities, with tens of thousands of well-trained fighters.

The document explicitly instructed militants to expel settlers, especially women and children, while abducting men aged 17 to 50. Sinwar framed the attack as a "humanitarian" mission to advance the Palestinian "right of return" narrative under the slogan "returning to our home," aiming to rally Palestinian public support. He also anticipated a surprise effect but warned of a potentially overwhelming Israeli response, including the use of all available means, even a "nuclear bomb," emphasizing the operation as a life-or-death struggle.

The plan detailed the operational units responsible for breaching the border fence, prepared over a year in advance, highlighting a well-organized military strategy. Sinwar sought to involve the international community by linking the attack to historical grievances like the Nakba. He also hoped the attack’s shock would inspire other fronts to join, coordinating with Hezbollah and Iran for a multi-theater conflict.

Originally, 2,500 militants were to breach the border at 25 points, but the actual attack involved over 60 breach points with fewer fighters dispersed over a wider area. The document assigned about ten militants per settlement, with eight smaller communities targeted by 200 fighters each and three large cities by 1,200 fighters, though the cities were unnamed. Sinwar’s plan included expelling settlers toward the sea and capturing documents and phones, but the actual attack resulted in executions rather than orderly evacuations.

Additionally, Sinwar addressed neutralizing IDF bases and delaying reinforcements, including from the Tze’elim base. The document underscores the depth of Israeli intelligence failure and the lack of preparedness for the scale of Hamas’s coordinated assault on October 7.