IDF Intelligence Planned Hamas Cell Strike Days Before Oct. 7, Report Says
Translated & summarized from Kipa by baba
Four days before the October 7 Hamas attack, Israeli intelligence was preparing to dismantle a Hamas cell directing terror from Gaza into Judea and Samaria. The operation, codenamed "The West Bank Headquarters," was postponed until after the holidays and never executed. A subsequent internal review found Military Intelligence had limited access to Hamas's core secrets. Former Shin Bet officials cited a lack of IDF cooperation and political approval as reasons for their limited operational capacity against Gaza-based terror directors.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Israeli intelligence planned an operation against a Hamas terror cell four days before the October 7 attack.
- The operation targeting "The West Bank Headquarters" was postponed and never carried out.
- A senior intelligence official was briefed on the cell's activities and the planned strike.
- An internal review found Military Intelligence had limited access to Hamas's core secrets.
- Former Shin Bet officials cited lack of cooperation and political approval for limited action.
Days before the October 7 Hamas attack, Israeli security forces were preparing an operation against a Hamas terror infrastructure operating from Gaza and directing attacks in Judea and Samaria. However, according to a report by "Israel Hayom," the operational plan targeting a group dubbed "The West Bank Headquarters" was never implemented. Four days before the massacre, on October 3, 2023, the then-head of Military Intelligence, Major General Aharon Haliva, visited the Yarkon base in the western Negev. During the visit, he met with personnel from Unit 8200 and listened in real-time to a conversation between two senior Hamas officials. He was then presented with a briefing summarizing intelligence on Gaza, which included details on "The West Bank Headquarters." This codename referred to a group of released Palestinian prisoners from the Gilad Shalit deal, who had been exiled to Gaza and used their connections in Judea and Samaria to advance terror activities.
The "Israel Hayom" report indicates that the briefing stated Military Intelligence, Shin Bet, and the Air Force were preparing an operation to strike this infrastructure by eliminating some of its members. The operation was slated to commence "after the holidays." A former security official noted that this infrastructure was responsible for a significant portion of the attacks directed from Gaza toward Judea and Samaria at that time. The Shin Bet was particularly pushing for this operation, facing hundreds of terror axes originating in Gaza and targeting Judea and Samaria, involving funding, weapons, and instructions from Gaza to operatives in the West Bank.
Despite the planning, the operation never took place. On October 7, four days after Haliva's visit, Hamas launched its surprise attack. A subsequent internal Military Intelligence review revealed limited intelligence and cyber access to Gaza, and that crucial information found on Hamas computers after the ground offensive began had not been available to Military Intelligence prior to the war. The review concluded that Military Intelligence had failed to penetrate the core secrets of the terror organization. Former senior Shin Bet officials claimed that the service's ability to act against terror directors in Gaza in the years leading up to the attack was limited due to the need for cooperation with the IDF and political approval, with one describing the situation as "abandonment of the settlements in Judea and Samaria."
