Debunking Myths About Ultra-Orthodox Demographics and Economic Impact

A recent article in "Yedioth Ahronoth" and Ynet by Gad Lior and Yaron Druckman warns of a severe economic crisis in Israel by 2050, potentially costing a quarter-trillion shekels annually and leading to national insolvency, if the ultra-Orthodox population continues to grow alongside low male employment, lack of core studies, and limited military service. However, an expert in Israeli demographics argues that these dramatic predictions are based on flawed assumptions. The expert, who has studied demographic processes for nearly forty years, points to his own research which re-examines common myths about demographic trends, emphasizing that dynamic demographic processes should not be treated as fixed trends. He contends that projections, such as the Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) forecast that the ultra-Orthodox population will constitute 32% of Israel by 2065, often rely on a single medium-variant scenario and fail to adequately consider crucial factors like population group transitions.

The expert highlights the wide range of CBS projections for 2065, with the ultra-Orthodox population potentially numbering between 4.2 million (low variant) and 9.1 million (high variant). He also reframes the "anti-Zionist majority" concern by examining the ultra-Orthodox proportion within the "Hebrew population" (Jews and integrated immigrants), suggesting even the highest variant would not result in an ultra-Orthodox majority. Furthermore, research from the Institute for Ultra-Orthodox Strategy and Policy indicates that by 2065, the ultra-Orthodox could comprise 18%-23% of the total population, a figure significantly lower than the CBS medium-variant forecast. This discrepancy underscores the dramatic impact of measurement methods and assumptions.

Demographic trends are not static. The expert cites a 2021 study showing that about 13.3% of those raised in ultra-Orthodox families do not identify as such in adulthood, with estimates of this "leaving rate" around 14-15%. Additionally, ultra-Orthodox fertility rates have declined from over seven children per woman in the early 2000s to about six in recent years. Immigration also plays a significant role, with most new immigrants not being ultra-Orthodox, thus increasing the non-ultra-Orthodox Hebrew population and moderating the relative growth of the ultra-Orthodox segment.

Regarding employment, the article notes a significant increase in ultra-Orthodox employment over the past two decades: male employment rose from about 35% in 2002 to 53.3% in 2025, and female employment from 50% to 81%. While male employment growth has slowed since 2015, past economic policies and vocational training have proven effective in influencing employment patterns, suggesting future improvements are possible with active policy. The comparison to Greece's potential insolvency is also challenged, as Greece faces a shrinking, aging population and low fertility rates, unlike Israel's growing, younger demographic. Israel's public debt-to-GDP ratio, while increased due to the war, remains significantly lower than in many other developed nations.

The expert concludes that while challenges like low employment, lack of core education, and limited military service among the ultra-Orthodox require urgent attention, the potential economic impact should be assessed transparently and based on realistic, dynamic assumptions, not as a predetermined doomsday scenario. The real danger lies not in the growth of the ultra-Orthodox population itself, but in the failure of policymakers to transform this growing human potential into a source of economic and national strength.