Ben-Gurion's Views on Gaza Occupation Revealed

Newly revealed documents from the 70th anniversary of the Sinai War show former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's complex stance on the Gaza Strip. In a conversation with IDF officers after the 1956 war, Ben-Gurion explained his support for occupying Gaza as a military necessity but strongly opposed its annexation. He famously stated, "If I believed in miracles, I would want it swallowed by the sea," expressing his deep reservations about prolonged Israeli control.

Ben-Gurion articulated that while the Egyptian forces concentrated in Gaza posed a significant threat, potentially reaching Tel Aviv in a surprise attack, and Palestinian fedayeen raids and attacks on border communities like Nahal Oz and Nirim were a constant concern, annexing Gaza would come at too high a price. He cited the Strip's large population, estimated at around 300,000, with 180,000 to 190,000 refugees, and the potential for a persistent underground resistance.

He warned that prolonged occupation would isolate Israel internationally, especially given UN opposition, and could damage its global standing and domestic support. Furthermore, Ben-Gurion feared that continued control would hinder Israel's ability to acquire crucial weaponry for future conflicts, potentially facing adversaries with superior air and tank capabilities. He envisioned future wars impacting civilian centers like Tel Aviv and Haifa, leading to civilian casualties.

The revelations are part of a collection published by the IDF archives to mark the 70th anniversary of Operation Kadesh. The archive's dedicated website features original documents, maps, photographs, and information on commanders who began their careers in the War of Independence. Operation Kadesh, launched on October 29, 1956, saw the IDF capture Gaza and parts of Sinai, but international pressure, led by the US, forced Israel's withdrawal within months.

In a separate protocol, Shimon Peres, then Director General of the Ministry of Defense, recounted the difficulties in acquiring weapons during the War of Independence, with most arms coming from Czechoslovakia and secret purchases made across Europe. Peres also highlighted Ben-Gurion's strategic view of the balance of power with Arab nations, noting that while an Israeli victory in a battle was not necessarily final, an Arab victory could be decisive.