Netanyahu Demands Broad Government, Rejects Rotation; Negotiators Reveal Deal Details
Translated & summarized from Alarab by baba
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is demanding to lead a broad national government and refuses a rotation agreement with Gadi Eisenkot, who has received 67 recommendations to form a government. Past negotiations, like the 2021 Bennett-Lapid deal, reveal complex tactics and the creation of special portfolios to satisfy coalition partners. Experts advise Eisenkot to negotiate with all parties simultaneously and maintain ambiguity in his own strategy. The fragility of rotation agreements, as seen in the Netanyahu-Gantz government, underscores the importance of robust guarantees and party commitment.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Benjamin Netanyahu insists on leading a broad government and rejects a rotation agreement with Gadi Eisenkot.
- Gadi Eisenkot has received recommendations from 67 Knesset members to form a government.
- Past negotiations, like the 2021 Bennett-Lapid deal, involved complex tactics and the creation of special portfolios.
- Experts advise Eisenkot to negotiate with all parties simultaneously and maintain ambiguity.
- Rotation agreements, like the Netanyahu-Gantz government, have historically collapsed due to lack of guarantees.
- Avigdor Lieberman's ambiguous stance is seen as a strategic advantage in coalition talks.
Amidst a political stalemate following recent Israeli elections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is insisting on leading a "broad national government" with his traditional allies. He refuses to relinquish the premiership or enter a rotation agreement with Gadi Eisenkot, who has secured recommendations from 67 Knesset members to form a government.
Past Israeli coalition negotiations reveal a striking paradox: in 2021, Netanyahu's Likud party itself pushed for Naftali Bennett to serve as prime minister first in a rotation deal, aiming to persuade Gideon Sa'ar to join a right-wing government. Testimonies from individuals involved in previous Israeli government formation talks, reported by Israeli media, shed light on closed-door dealings, tactics for securing positions and powers, and the limited political and legal guarantees for rotation agreements.
In 2021, Likud insisted Bennett lead first to overcome Sa'ar's opposition to a Netanyahu-led government, as Sa'ar had pledged not to serve under him. The idea was for Sa'ar to join Bennett's government for a year before Netanyahu took over, integrating Sa'ar into the coalition. Negotiations ran parallel with Likud and Yair Lapid's Yesh Atid, using Lapid's path as leverage against Netanyahu. Despite reaching advanced stages and agreements on most issues, the potential coalition lacked the two necessary votes for a majority, leading to the collapse of Netanyahu's formation effort. Lapid later succeeded in forming a government with Bennett, who became prime minister first.
In 2004, during negotiations to expand Ariel Sharon's government before the disengagement plan, Sharon instructed his negotiator to "give them the least possible, and leave us the most possible." Arab Knesset members provided a safety net for Sharon when he lost his coalition majority, a fact noted by Netanyahu, then Finance Minister, and Israel Katz, then Agriculture Minister. To accommodate Shimon Peres joining Sharon's government, a new ministry was created for him, the "Second Deputy Prime Minister" portfolio, demonstrating how political positions are invented to satisfy coalition partners.
As Eisenkot prepares to receive the mandate to form a government, experts advise him to negotiate with all parties simultaneously and avoid finalizing any single agreement until understandings are reached with others. This strategy prevents early deals from becoming leverage for other parties. The 2006 experience of Ehud Olmert, who used three parallel negotiation teams, is cited as an example of managing complex talks. The importance of understanding the governing document for the final agreement is also stressed, as seen in the Bennett-Lapid negotiations where their central agreement superseded other pacts.
The Netanyahu-Gantz rotation government's collapse due to a budget crisis highlights the need for legal and political guarantees in rotation agreements. The Bennett-Lapid government's narrow majority also showed how fragile coalitions can be. Experts emphasize that while agreements are crucial, the parties' commitment is paramount. Trust is not essential for negotiations, as mechanisms and guarantees can compensate, but these must have real enforcement power. The failure of Aryeh Deri's promise to Gantz and the limited executive power of the Israeli president to enforce guarantees are noted, contrasting with the enforcement tools available to the US.
Negotiators also consider Avigdor Lieberman's stance, who refuses to join a minority government or serve under Netanyahu. Some believe a minority government is feasible, and Arab parties might find it difficult to support a no-confidence vote against Eisenkot. Election pledges shouldn't prevent practical compromises, such as a modified conscription law. Lieberman's strategy of maintaining ambiguity provides him leverage, and experts advise Eisenkot to adopt a similar approach, keeping his intentions unclear to maximize his maneuvering room and prevent Netanyahu from preempting his moves.
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