Netanyahu Faces Tough Compromise to Preserve Rule Amidst Coalition Talks

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be forced to make significant concessions to maintain his government, as coalition negotiations present complex paths forward. The "Change Bloc," led by Gadi Eisenkot, faces the challenge of forming either a minority government or a coalition that includes the ultra-Orthodox parties, a move complicated by Avigdor Lieberman's "red lines" and Arie Deri's decision-making.

The ultra-Orthodox parties, particularly United Torah Judaism, are leveraging their position to pressure Netanyahu, demanding a conscription law before coalition talks begin, indicating a deep distrust of mere promises. They fear returning to their previous situation without a concrete legislative solution. For Arie Deri, leader of the Shas party, the dilemma involves deciding whether to break with Netanyahu and explain to his voters why a government led by Eisenkot might better protect Shas's interests.

Forming a coalition between the ultra-Orthodox and a bloc led by Eisenkot, which has pledged to enact a significant conscription law, appears difficult. However, United Torah Judaism sees potential benefit in exploring this path, as Netanyahu has historically failed to deliver on their demands. A government including Eisenkot, Lieberman, and Lapid might struggle to offer a more lenient draft exemption but could pass a law with broader public and political support, potentially offering more stability than past promises.

Lieberman has agreed to discuss a conscription framework based on his 2018 proposal but has not committed to accepting the ultra-Orthodox demands, creating a potential conflict if a deal appears to be a capitulation to his voters. Naftali Bennett faces a similar challenge; a government formed on broken promises that quickly collapses could hand Netanyahu a significant advantage in future elections. Therefore, for them, a failed coalition formation might be preferable to an unstable government.

Even a slim 61-seat majority government with the ultra-Orthodox would grapple with deep divisions over conscription, religion and state, and the budget. While Arab parties' abstention could help it survive votes, internal coalition disputes would persist. A conscription law satisfying the ultra-Orthodox might alienate Lieberman, while one satisfying Lieberman could lead to the ultra-Orthodox leaving. A government unable to pass a budget or key legislation would struggle to endure.

Netanyahu might have to abandon some allies and core principles, while Eisenkot would have to serve under someone he vowed to replace. The stark differences were evident in consultations between President Isaac Herzog and Likud representatives, with Herzog questioning willingness to part with "extremist elements" and Likud emphasizing their foundational principles. A unity government under these terms would weaken Netanyahu's bloc, and Eisenkot's participation would undermine his central campaign promise.

Netanyahu is currently waiting to see if internal disputes within the "change bloc" will derail Eisenkot's efforts. As the possibility of losing power grows, Netanyahu may face greater political costs for refusing to consider unity. Progress towards an Eisenkot-led government, especially an agreement with Shas and United Torah Judaism, could force Netanyahu to choose between substantial concessions in a unity government or losing power entirely.

To form a government, Eisenkot must achieve consensus on the conscription law between parties with opposing commitments. The ultra-Orthodox need assurance that their agreed-upon arrangement will be more secure than Netanyahu's promises, while Bennett and Lieberman must believe it won't compromise their own pledges. Success would create a government few believed possible; failure could mean his partners kept their options open for themselves.