Iran's Secret Billions-Dollar Network Bypasses US Sanctions for Military Buildup
Translated & summarized from i24NEWS Arabic by baba
A Reuters investigation revealed a secret Iranian military procurement network that has imported at least $2 billion in military equipment since January 2025, bypassing U.S. sanctions. The network uses shell companies and overseas intermediaries to acquire components for missiles and drones, leveraging illicit oil revenues. Despite sanctions, Iran continues to build its arsenal, with imports arriving from countries including China and Russia. The UAE has denied accusations of facilitating these shipments.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Iran's secret military procurement network has imported at least $2 billion in equipment since January 2025.
- The network uses shell companies and overseas intermediaries to bypass U.S. sanctions and Western blockades.
- Imports include rocket fuel, explosives, missile components, and heavy trucks convertible to launch platforms.
- Equipment has arrived from China, Russia, and Germany, with the UAE denying facilitating shipments.
- The network enables Iran to continue bolstering its missile and drone arsenal despite economic restrictions.
A clandestine Iranian military procurement network has enabled Tehran to continue bolstering its arsenal of missiles and drones, despite Western sanctions and a U.S. blockade. An investigation by Reuters revealed that this system imported at least $2 billion worth of military equipment and materials since January 2025 through a complex web of companies and entities linked to Iran's Ministry of Defense. These entities operate with commercial fronts and intricate financial and logistical pathways.
The investigation, based on thousands of financial and government records, company documents, and import data, uncovered a system involving over 5,000 entities, many starting with the abbreviation "WDJA," associated with the Ministry of Defense. This network forms the backbone of Iran's efforts to acquire military hardware and circumvent sanctions.
Iran utilizes shell companies and overseas commercial intermediaries to procure military and industrial equipment, leveraging illicit oil sale revenues. The financial system largely avoids direct cross-border money transfers, with 97% of reviewed shipments settled without such transfers. Iranian intermediaries based abroad purchase equipment using funds deposited in foreign banks and then ship it to Iran.
Many of these clandestine entities share a single address in Tehran, identical to that of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Most were established in 2013, coinciding with a period of intensified sanctions. The investigation linked some entities to the Revolutionary Guard and missile and drone programs.
One prominent entity, "WDJA 346428," imported significant quantities of rocket fuel, explosives, weapon manufacturing components, and heavy trucks usable as missile launchers between January 2025 and June 2026. Imports also included precision industrial machinery like advanced CNC lathes and electronic furnaces, suitable for manufacturing missile and drone components.
Experts believe these imports can significantly contribute to rebuilding Iran's arsenal and expanding its production capacity for missiles and drones, including Shahed drones. Equipment arrived via land, sea, and air from China, Russia, and Germany, as well as through Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. China denied knowledge of the situation, while Russia and U.S. officials did not respond to requests for comment. Former U.S. Treasury official Mayad Malki described the network as an integrated system for Iran's foreign military trade.
Import data also showed Iranian military imports worth $27 million registered as originating from the UAE since the war's outset, primarily arriving by sea. The UAE has categorically denied these accusations, stating they are baseless and affirming its commitment to preventing illicit activities. The network has also been implicated in importing heavy trucks, such as Italian Iveco Eurocargo models, which can be converted into mobile, camouflaged missile and drone launch platforms, making final import tracking difficult.
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