Israel Probes Security Failures After Flydubai Pilot's Attack Plot
Translated & summarized from Davar by baba
An investigation is underway into security failures following an attempted attack by a Flydubai co-pilot on a flight to Israel. The co-pilot, an Omani citizen, was able to board the flight despite potential prior security concerns. The incident has highlighted a broader issue of aircrew from countries without diplomatic ties entering Israel, with 1,240 such individuals recorded in the past year. A dispute exists among Israeli agencies, including the Ministry of Transport, Shin Bet, Mossad, and the Population Authority, over who bears responsibility for vetting foreign aircrew and preventing such security breaches.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- An attempted attack by a Flydubai co-pilot on a flight to Israel has exposed significant security lapses.
- Authorities are investigating how an Omani co-pilot, who should not have been on the flight, gained access to the cockpit.
- Hundreds of aircrew from countries without diplomatic ties to Israel have entered the country in the past year.
- A dispute rages between Israeli agencies over responsibility for vetting foreign aircrew and aviation security.
- The State Comptroller had previously identified systemic aviation security issues and recommended policy reviews.
- Investigations are ongoing into the conduct of two senior officials within the Ministry of Transport's security department.
Nearly two weeks after an attempted attack on a Flydubai flight to Israel, authorities are still investigating how an Omani co-pilot, who should not have been assigned to the flight, gained access to the cockpit. Details have emerged about the control chain preceding the flight, alongside a sharp dispute between various bodies over who was responsible for preventing the incident. The UAE's Attorney General confirmed the co-pilot, Al-Hamami, planned to hijack the plane and crash it at Ben Gurion Airport, an act that could have resulted in mass casualties.
Further information revealed that the issue extends beyond this single flight. Data presented to the Knesset indicated that hundreds of aircrew members from countries with which Israel has no diplomatic relations have entered Israel in the past year. While information on these crew members is collected by state systems, it has often not been used for security checks. Al-Hamami, an Omani citizen with a Syrian mother, was reportedly grounded in Oman prior to joining Flydubai due to concerns of Islamist radicalization, yet was hired and assigned to flights to Israel.
The Ministry of Transport stated that Flydubai had committed to Israel not to assign crew members holding passports from countries without diplomatic relations to flights bound for Israel. The head of the Civil Aviation Authority confirmed that an Omani citizen should not have been on a flight to Israel. However, it was revealed that Al-Hamami was not an isolated case, with 1,240 aircrew members from countries without diplomatic ties entering Israel in the past year, including those with Syrian and Lebanese citizenship.
This situation shifts the focus from how Al-Hamami accessed one specific flight to how it became a widespread phenomenon for crew members not meeting flight requirements to enter Israel. The State Comptroller had already identified a systemic problem in a classified May 2024 report on international aviation security, recommending a comprehensive review of aviation security policies and responsibilities, some of which dated back to the 1970s.
Disagreements persist over which agency holds primary responsibility. Transportation Minister Miri Regev attributed intelligence responsibility for foreign airlines like Flydubai to the Mossad, while the Shin Bet handles Israeli airlines. However, the legal framework is complex, with the Shin Bet responsible for Israeli aviation security abroad, the Ministry of Transport's Security Department overseeing foreign flights, and the Population and Immigration Authority having the authority to approve or deny entry. The Ministry of Transport claims it lacks the intelligence capabilities for thorough background checks on foreign pilots, while the National Center for Passenger Data Analysis (MALAN), established in 2023, collects data from airlines but its utilization for security purposes is debated.
Investigations are also underway by Lahav 433 into the conduct of two senior officials in the Ministry of Transport's security apparatus: Avraham (Avri) Cohen, head of the Security Department, and Dvir Rubinstein, director of the Aviation Security Operations Center. Cohen is being investigated for potentially holding an unapproved secondary position, while Rubinstein's private consulting work for foreign airlines, including Flydubai, is being examined for potential conflicts of interest. The core unresolved question remains: who was supposed to transform the raw information about the pilot's citizenship into a practical warning to prevent him from boarding the flight, and why were the State Comptroller's recommendations from 2024 not implemented.