Netanyahu Scuttled 2024 Hamas Hostage Deal for Personal Gain, Analyst Claims

A proposed 2024 hostage and prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Hamas, mediated by Qatar, reportedly collapsed due to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's personal interests, according to details revealed by "Walla!" and reported by "Arabs 48." The deal, whose full terms were not publicly disclosed, included provisions aimed at assisting Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who faced arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The forum of families of Israeli hostages had approached ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan, seeking the cancellation of these warrants. Khan reportedly indicated that such a cancellation was possible if Netanyahu demonstrated efforts toward peace, despite being accused of war crimes. The proposed deal also aimed to lift arrest warrants against Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Ismail Haniyeh, maintaining a balance. An Israeli source familiar with the negotiations suggested Khan believed an Israeli entity, possibly the Mossad, was interfering with a sexual harassment complaint against him within the ICC, and that dropping the warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant might resolve this issue. Khan had visited Gaza in December 2023 and was open to hearing testimonies from Israelis about the October 7th attacks, with the hostage families forum facilitating their travel to The Hague. However, the negotiations failed due to a "structural flaw," according to political analyst Nahum Barnea. Barnea explained that while heads of the Shin Bet (Ronen Bar), Mossad (David Barnea), and the military's hostage coordinator (Nitzan Alon) viewed obstacles as problems to be solved, Netanyahu saw them as opportunities to avoid a deal, with hostages paying the price. Barnea questioned the timing of these revelations, suggesting they expose the decision-making process of the former government. He described how leaks from Netanyahu's office to Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who threatened to collapse the government over a deal, were used to convince Americans that Netanyahu lacked the Knesset majority to approve it. Barnea argued this was a "ruse" to appease security officials and the Biden administration, as Smotrich and Ben-Gvir would not leave the government while pursuing their agendas. He speculated that Netanyahu's primary motivations were the timing of the deal, which he felt was too early to accept an end to the war after only nine months, and the potential perception of ending the war without "absolute victory." Additionally, Barnea suggested the deal was too convenient for Netanyahu, making it difficult to explain his own potential absolution in The Hague alongside Hamas leaders and Khan. The shifting US political landscape also played a role; with Biden's withdrawal from the presidential race and Donald Trump's potential return to power, Netanyahu may have sought to avoid a deal that would benefit Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. Barnea concluded that Netanyahu might believe waiting was worthwhile, as key Hamas leaders could be eliminated and Trump could be re-elected, potentially leading to further action against Iran, despite the war's unachieved objectives and Israel's diminished global standing.