Japan's Island Dispute With Russia Presents Israel With a Diplomatic Dilemma

Japan is intensifying its long-standing claim over four islands occupied by the Soviet Union after World War II, a dispute that has prevented a formal peace treaty with Russia. The islands, Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai, are considered Russian territory by Moscow but are demanded by Tokyo. Historically, Japan has pursued its claim through diplomatic means, maintaining a restrained defense policy reliant on its alliance with the United States. However, with the growing military power of China and threats from North Korea, Japan is bolstering its defense capabilities and seeking greater security independence. Simultaneously, Russia's prolonged war in Ukraine has exposed its military limitations and damaged its image as a swift power, creating an opportunity for Japan to reassert its territorial demands. Recent statements and protests by Japanese officials, including Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, signal a firmer stance, suggesting that while not overtly threatening military action, Japan may be considering options beyond diplomacy. This situation creates a complex challenge for Israel, which maintains friendly relations with Japan and is a US ally, while also dealing with Russia's close cooperation with Iran and its generally unfavorable policy towards Israel. While seemingly straightforward to support Japan, Russia's argument for retaining the islands, based on the outcomes of World War II, touches upon sensitive Israeli policy regarding territories acquired after conflicts. Russia's logic implies that aggressive war can lead to territorial changes, and aggressors may not necessarily expect a return to the status quo. Israel has employed similar reasoning after the 1948 War of Independence and the 1967 Six-Day War to justify its control over territories beyond the partition plan and armistice lines, respectively. Currently, Israel argues that the October 7th attacks and threats from multiple fronts necessitate a new security reality, including control over areas it deems vital for its defense in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. Automatic support for Japan's claim could undermine Israel's own arguments for retaining territories. The paradox lies in Russia, an adversary, presenting a territorial argument that Israel might wish to use. Given the circumstances, Israel should avoid public intervention unless compelled to choose sides. It must prepare for potential requests for support from Japan or for the issue to arise in international forums like the UN. Supporting Japan could weaken Israel's territorial claims, while refusing could strain relations with a key ally. Israel needs to develop principles to evaluate such demands case-by-case without automatic commitment.

The "Japanese story" offers Israel three lessons: First, a nation must be strong and perceived as strong, as Russia's diminished image emboldens others to raise old claims. Second, time does not erase territorial disputes; Japan's eighty-year claim shows that Israel cannot assume time alone will lead to Palestinian acceptance of changing territorial realities. Third, internal Israeli divisions, while democratic, can be perceived as weakness by adversaries, as demonstrated by the underestimation of Israel's resilience before October 7th. While internal debate is vital, understanding its external perception is crucial. Finally, the alliance with the US is essential but not a substitute for independent defense capabilities, as both Israel and Japan must be prepared for potential US inaction. Friendship between nations is important but does not eliminate conflicting interests. Israel should maintain ties with Japan, exercise caution regarding intervention in its dispute with Russia, and preemptively formulate a response to the dilemma it may face.