Hamas Adapts to Survive Gaza War, Shifts from Direct Rule to Indirect Control

Three years of war have severely weakened Hamas, impacting its fighters, commanders, infrastructure, production capabilities, security apparatus, and ability to train new recruits to pre-war levels. The Hamas of 2026 is not the organization that existed before October 7th; its military structure has been heavily damaged, and its capacity for rearmament is more limited. While recruitment continues, it does not necessarily restore the quality, training, or military structure of the past.

Hamas is currently focused on adaptation rather than rebuilding its pre-war military strength. The organization aims to preserve what remains, rebuild human infrastructure, secure income sources, maintain its security systems, reintegrate into civilian institutions, and prevent the emergence of a Palestinian alternative. This adaptation, however, does not signify a relinquishing of control over Gaza but rather a shift in its control model.

Currently, no alternative Palestinian body has established full, independent control over the Gaza Strip. Even a newly formed technocratic committee, intended to replace Hamas's governance and security mechanisms, has limited capacity and relies on security and political arrangements. Hamas views the emergence of various militias and armed groups not as a challenge to its overall control but as a secondary issue, asserting its role as the ultimate arbiter of power within Palestinian society.

Formally, Hamas has agreed to dismantle its governing mechanism and transfer civil responsibility to the technocratic committee. This is seen as a strategic concession to preserve the organization, allowing it to shed direct responsibility for Gaza's devastated infrastructure and reliance on international aid. By transitioning from a model of "we are the government" to "there is a government" while remaining the influential political and social force, Hamas can avoid direct accountability for governance failures.

The technocratic committee may assume the burden of civil affairs and reconstruction, while Hamas seeks to maintain its power networks, weaponry, and status as the most organized political entity in Gaza. This indirect control model allows Hamas to influence the new administration, its bureaucracy, and resource allocation, operating within an environment where its networks remain deeply entrenched. The organization's strategic goals remain unchanged, but its "operating system" has shifted from direct rule to indirect influence, from a military force to a guerrilla one, and from a monopoly on power to controlling those who hold power.

Hamas continues to collect taxes, particularly from the private sector and smuggled goods, and its tax and economy departments have resumed operations. This includes a "double taxation" model along the supply chain. The organization also influences the flow of humanitarian aid, using militias and subcontractors to control aid trucks, extract a portion, and charge Hamas for "licenses" to operate. This control over the movement of goods, taxation, and markets allows Hamas to maintain influence and dependence.

Beyond its military wing, Hamas has built a quasi-state structure over two decades, including ministries, local authorities, education, health, welfare, police, economy, and tax systems, employing tens of thousands. This civilian infrastructure is crucial for the organization's survival and future. The demand to ensure the rights and employment of these workers is not just social but a mechanism for preserving organizational capacity. Hamas, as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, views control over the population as its most important strategic asset, leveraging its social, religious, and educational networks to maintain support and influence.