Expert Argues Government Propaganda Hinders War Investigation

Three years after the October 7th attacks, a comprehensive investigation into the war and its preceding failures has yet to occur. While outgoing State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman has released reports on various aspects of the war, the Supreme Court has barred him from examining core issues like the containment policy and intelligence failures. Petitions are pending before the Supreme Court demanding the government establish a state commission of inquiry, but a decision has been postponed until after the elections, potentially rendering it unnecessary if the opposition bloc wins and fulfills its promise to form such a commission.

Attorney Dori Klagsbald, a leading litigator and author on state commissions of inquiry, asserts that a state commission of inquiry is the appropriate legal tool for investigating matters of vital public importance, citing precedents like the Yom Kippur War and the Rabin assassination. He distinguishes this from the Second Lebanon War, which was investigated by a government-appointed review committee. Klagsbald notes that while the Supreme Court's ruling enhanced the powers of the Second Lebanon War committee to match those of a state commission, the key difference remains who appoints its members: the President of the Supreme Court or the government.

Klagsbald argues that investigating the events of October 7th remains crucial, even three years later, for understanding what occurred, identifying failures, and preventing future occurrences. However, he expresses a fundamental opposition to personal recommendations, viewing them as less essential and more harmful than beneficial. He explains that in cases where most officials have resigned, like after October 7th, a state commission of inquiry typically does not issue personal recommendations against the Prime Minister, as the public ultimately decides on their re-election. He also refutes the notion that the Agranat Commission did not address political echelon responsibility, stating it concluded the political level bore no responsibility.

Regarding the law governing commissions of inquiry, Klagsbald believes it should remain with the government, as they ultimately control the scope of the inquiry through the appointment letter. He criticizes the idea of the Supreme Court appointing a commission and defining its mandate as unprecedented and potentially entangling the judiciary in political disputes. Klagsbald dismisses the government's claims about public trust in a commission appointed by President Yitzhak Amit as propaganda designed to prevent the establishment of any commission, arguing that a politically appointed committee would be the least effective.

Klagsbald contends that the government's resistance stems from a fear of findings against them and their members. He reiterates his preference for commissions without personal recommendations, focusing instead on institutional lessons. He points to the Meron disaster investigation as an example where institutional recommendations led to significant changes. He also refutes the claim that most commission recommendations are not implemented, arguing that personal recommendations are often acted upon due to their popularity, while institutional changes, which are more complex, are frequently neglected by short-lived governments.