Israel Debates Arming Gazans 33 Years After Oslo Warnings

Thirty-three years after the warning "Don't give them guns" was first voiced, the debate over the future of Gaza has resurfaced. The current controversy centers on a proposal by Gadi Eisenkot, a candidate for prime minister, to train approximately 20,000 Gazans in Egypt. The author draws parallels to past events during the Oslo Accords era, questioning the risks associated with establishing a new Palestinian force and the future of security control in the Gaza Strip.

During the Oslo period, right-wing figures famously warned against arming Palestinians, a sentiment echoed today. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking ahead of the third anniversary of the October 7th massacre, stated that Hamas, despite its weakened state, would attempt to challenge Israel before elections. The head of the Southern Command, Yaniv Asor, pledged a "sharp and powerful response." Opposition figures, however, perceived this as an opportunity rather than a threat.

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman's recent intelligence on kidnapping intentions was dismissed by opposition leader Naftali Bennett as a failure of the current government, with Bennett asserting Hamas is currently the de facto sovereign. Ofer Winter added that the war has not yet achieved decisive victory. This political dynamic has led to an opposition that, while previously advocating for withdrawal to the Gaza border and transferring control to the Palestinian Authority, is now criticizing the government from the right.

The article details recent developments, including the return of all living hostages by October 2025 and the recovery of the last fallen soldier in January. Since then, a de facto ceasefire has led to IDF operations against terror infrastructure and systematic elimination of those involved in the October 7th attack. The Gaza Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Liron Biton, reported that Israel now controls over 63% of the Strip and has established nearly 40 new outposts.

Israel has accepted the "Trump Peace Council's" framework, with the condition that reconstruction is contingent on Hamas's disarmament. A limited pilot program in Rafah was approved in July, without a withdrawal from the current lines and with foreign forces requiring approval from the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister. However, this policy is not being strictly adhered to. In early August, UN Special Coordinator Nikolai Mladenov proposed a 15-point plan, which Bezalel Smotrich and Orit Struk argued differed significantly from what was presented to ministers, demanding an emergency discussion. Prime Minister Netanyahu subsequently stated that the IDF would not withdraw until Hamas is truly disarmed.

When the UN requested to deploy thousands of foreign soldiers in September, Smotrich and Struk reiterated their stance: "Any reconstruction, any entry of foreign forces, and any withdrawal of the IDF will not be carried out before the full demilitarization of the entire Gaza Strip." The author posits this is a division of labor that the opposition and left-wing media struggle to understand, with Netanyahu navigating delicate diplomatic waters and the Religious Zionists acting as a brake within the cabinet, collectively preventing strategic errors and leading to the IDF's current control of most of the Strip. Trump's own rule was clear: "They will disarm, or we will disarm them, and it will happen quickly, and perhaps violently." Mladenov has acknowledged that at the current pace, tunnel destruction will take over a decade, suggesting the day is approaching when it will be admitted that only the IDF can complete the task.

The opposition, meanwhile, points to foreign soldiers surveying land in southern Gaza as proof of surrender, failing to grasp that these 200 soldiers, under Israeli veto, represent a minimal cost for diplomatic freedom of action. In reality, no reconstruction has begun. Eisenkot's proposal is presented as a "clever trick." Lieberman promises a full 45-day occupation followed by withdrawal and handover to a responsible party. Bennett demands Hamas's elimination before reconstruction, a condition already incorporated by the government with the understanding it won't happen. Eisenkot's specific proposal, discussed on a podcast with Matan Kahana's assistance to portray him as right-wing, involves training 19,000-20,000 non-Hamas Gazans in Egypt. This plan is met with skepticism, with one commentator quipping Eisenkot would need security to prevent him from giving interviews.

The article revisits the "Don't give them guns" warning with historical examples. In September 2000, a Palestinian police officer serving with Israeli officer Yossi Tabaja in Qalqilya opened fire on their jeep. In June 2007, thousands of trained and equipped Palestinian Authority security personnel in Gaza collapsed within days, their weapons falling into Hamas's hands and later being used against Israel. The author questions why future armed Gazans would act differently.

The victory is not yet complete, as coalition leaders themselves acknowledge. The path to completion involves political patience, and Hamas's defeat will only occur through the IDF, not Egyptian-trained Gazans. The author concludes that Israeli citizens are wise and difficult to deceive, urging those who voted for the right and are considering Eisenkot to understand the potential consequences, recalling the ignored warning from 33 years ago.