Netanyahu Feared Heavy Casualties, Hostage Use in Early War Discussions
Translated & summarized from Mako by baba
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially hesitated to launch a ground offensive in Gaza due to fears of thousands of casualties and Hamas using hostages as shields. He also expressed extreme concern about Hezbollah's potential to destroy northern Israeli buildings, comparing it to an atomic bomb's impact. These early war concerns, revealed by sources, contrast with a narrative of decisive leadership, though Netanyahu later made significant decisions. The military and Defense Minister eventually persuaded him to proceed with the Gaza ground operation.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Prime Minister Netanyahu feared thousands of casualties in early Gaza ground offensive talks.
- Netanyahu worried Hamas would use hostages as human shields on rooftops.
- He described potential Hezbollah attacks as comparable to an atomic bomb's damage.
- Defense Minister Gallant and the IDF pressured Netanyahu to approve the Gaza ground operation.
- Sources suggest Netanyahu's early war statements differed from his promoted narrative.
In the initial weeks following the October 7th Hamas attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed significant apprehension regarding a ground offensive in Gaza, fearing thousands of Israeli casualties. He also voiced concerns that Hamas would place hostages on rooftops to use them as human shields, stating that public opinion was not yet prepared for the potential costs of such an operation. These hesitations were shared in closed conversations and within the war cabinet, where Netanyahu reportedly said, "If we go into a maneuver, we will have thousands of dead." Ultimately, pressure from the military and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant convinced Netanyahu to approve the IDF's ground operation.
Netanyahu also conveyed deep concern over potential escalation with Hezbollah. He reportedly told associates and security officials that a sustained barrage from Hezbollah could lead to the destruction of buildings in northern Israel, comparing the potential damage to that of an atomic bomb. He described the feeling as if "Israel would not be finished" even if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, highlighting the perceived existential threat from Hezbollah.
These statements, made in the early days of the war, contrast with a narrative promoted by Netanyahu and his associates that he was decisive and in control from the outset. Sources from political, military, and diplomatic circles suggest a different picture of his early actions and statements. While acknowledging that Netanyahu later made brave decisions that shifted regional power balances, his initial deep-seated fear of Hezbollah might explain the perceived restraint prior to October 7th and a potential reluctance for proactive measures on October 11th.
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