Netanyahu Rejected Hamas Elimination Orders Before Oct. 7, Reports Say
Translated & summarized from Zman Yisrael by baba
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly rejected recommendations to assassinate senior Hamas officials six days before the October 7th attacks, instead ordering "operational readiness" for such actions. Sources claim he prioritized peace with Saudi Arabia and avoiding escalation over immediate eliminations. Media reports in March 2025 that Netanyahu ordered the killings were described as false, misrepresenting his directive. Investigations suggest he imposed practical limitations, forbidding air strikes and demanding low-signature operations.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected recommendations to assassinate senior Hamas officials before the October 7th attacks.
- Netanyahu instead ordered "operational readiness" for assassinations and increased humanitarian aid to Gaza.
- Sources claim Netanyahu prioritized peace with Saudi Arabia and avoiding escalation over immediate eliminations.
- Media reports in March 2025 claiming Netanyahu ordered the killings were described as false.
- Investigations suggest Netanyahu imposed practical limitations, forbidding air strikes and demanding low-signature operations.
- The State Comptroller's report refuted the assumption that Hamas was deterred prior to the attacks.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected recommendations from the security establishment to eliminate senior Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip just six days before the October 7th attacks, according to reports citing sources present at a meeting on October 1, 2023. Instead of approving targeted assassinations, Netanyahu instructed the security forces to "act with balance and management to cool down the fronts and prevent escalation," and to "advance operational readiness for assassinations."
During the meeting, then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi reportedly recommended eliminating Hamas operatives and the leadership of the West Bank headquarters. However, Netanyahu did not authorize these actions, emphasizing that the "supreme goal is peace with Saudi Arabia" and that Israel must maintain restraint. He also instructed to increase humanitarian aid to Gaza and advance a civilian arrangement with Hamas.
Contrary to some media reports published in March 2025 that claimed Netanyahu had ordered the elimination of Hamas leaders a week before the attack, the reports indicate these publications were false. These reports, some of which were based on Netanyahu's own response to the meeting's summary, misrepresented his directive for "readiness for assassinations" as an approval to carry them out. The Prime Minister's office stated that attempts to shift blame from the Shin Bet's "enormous failure" on October 7th were unhelpful, noting that the Shin Bet had described the handling of border breaches as a "success" and recommended civilian benefits for Hamas to maintain stability.
Further details from investigative reports by journalists Ronen Bergman and Yuval Robovitch in ynet suggest that Netanyahu imposed practical limitations on any potential strikes, forbidding air attacks and demanding "low-signature operations" such as sabotage or close-range assassinations. One source described Netanyahu as never saying he was against assassinations but always speaking only of "preparation," while in practice forbidding actual strikes. Another report from February 2026 cited a senior security official claiming Netanyahu refused to eliminate Yahya Sinwar 11 times in the months leading up to the attack.
The background to Netanyahu's decisions, as documented by the State Comptroller in November 2025, was his belief that Hamas was deterred and his desire to avoid escalation that could jeopardize stability and the normalization process with Saudi Arabia. The Comptroller's report refuted the assumption that Hamas was deterred and not seeking conflict, a notion proven wrong on October 7th.
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