Israel's Regional Shift Post-Oct. 7 Leaves Key Questions Unanswered
Translated & summarized from Maariv by baba
Three years after October 7th, Israel has reshaped the Middle East but has not defined its regional goals or an end to the conflict. While the IDF has made significant gains in Gaza, Hamas remains a persistent force, complicating efforts to establish an alternative governance. The prolonged war strains Israeli reserves and raises public concerns about future security, with a majority fearing a repeat of the attacks. Political discourse is divided on accountability, and Israel must now define its strategic objectives beyond military action.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Israel has significantly altered the Middle East post-October 7th but lacks a defined regional order or end goal.
- Despite IDF gains in Gaza, Hamas remains a governing force, collecting taxes and maintaining operatives.
- The prolonged conflict strains Israeli reserve forces and raises concerns about the sustainability of its security doctrine.
- A majority of Israelis fear a repeat of October 7th-style attacks, despite satisfaction with IDF performance.
- Political divisions persist over accountability for the October 7th failures, impacting election discourse.
- Israel must define its strategic objectives for Gaza beyond ongoing military operations.
Three years after the October 7th attacks, Israel has significantly altered the Middle East landscape, inflicting heavy blows on Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. However, the nation has yet to define its desired regional order or establish an endpoint for ongoing conflicts, according to an analysis. While Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas are rebuilding their capabilities, Israel has learned from the coordination failures of October 7th, recognizing that future attacks might be more unified.
In Gaza, the IDF now controls approximately 64% of the Strip, operating two divisions and around 30 outposts, fundamentally altering defensive lines. Hamas faces ammunition shortages and difficulties in training, with security officials reporting the elimination of 70 operatives, including three brigade commanders, in the past month alone. Despite these setbacks, Hamas remains a significant force, controlling parts of Gaza, managing tens of thousands of operatives, and collecting taxes on aid entering the Strip, which funds its operations and governance, though not its pre-war military strength.
Israel faces a challenge in establishing a stable alternative to Hamas in Gaza. Without a governing body capable of civilian authority and enforcement, military gains are eroded. The resulting vacuum allows Hamas to persist as a governing entity, collecting taxes and maintaining its armed force, making it difficult to foster a viable replacement. This prolonged conflict also strains Israel's reserve forces, with many having served over 500 days since October 7th. By 2027, a reduction in reserve duty scope is anticipated, further complicated by the ongoing debate over the conscription of the ultra-Orthodox community, which impacts the sustainability of Israel's new security doctrine.
Public opinion reflects a complex assessment of the war's progress. A recent INSS poll indicates that only 27% of Israelis believe the war in Gaza has been won, though 61% are satisfied with the IDF's performance, compared to only 34% satisfied with the government's management. Critically, 59% fear a repeat of October 7th-style events on the Gaza border in the coming years. The political discourse, particularly with upcoming elections, is divided on accountability for the initial failures, with debates ongoing about the establishment of investigative committees.
Israel has shifted its security concept from containment and regulation to initiative and territorial control. However, the article argues that the enemy's continued existence, even in a weakened state, prevents a clear declaration of victory and prolongs the conflict. The government must define its objectives for Gaza and the desired regional order, as military actions alone cannot provide lasting answers. While the IDF can maintain achievements and buy time, the political echelon must determine the long-term strategy and what constitutes a satisfactory outcome.