India's Shift From Palestinian Advocate to Close Israeli Partner
Translated & summarized from Arab48 by baba
India's foreign policy has shifted dramatically from advocating for Palestinian rights to becoming a close strategic partner with Israel since diplomatic ties were established in 1992. This evolution, driven by mutual strategic interests and a shared majoritarian nationalist ideology, has seen deepening cooperation in defense, technology, and intelligence. Despite the ongoing conflict in Gaza and historical opposition to Zionism, India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has embraced Israel, leading to significant military and intelligence collaborations. This convergence raises ethical questions in India about compromising its founding principles of equal citizenship and anti-colonialism.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- India has transformed from a defender of Palestinian rights to a close strategic partner with Israel since 1992.
- The partnership is driven by mutual strategic interests, defense, security, intelligence, and technology cooperation.
- Historically, India opposed the creation of Israel, with Mahatma Gandhi stating Palestine belonged to the Arabs.
- Under PM Narendra Modi, the relationship has become openly celebrated, with a special strategic partnership planned for 2026.
- India is Israel's largest buyer of major arms, receiving 29% of its exports between 2021-2025.
- The convergence is fueled by shared majoritarian nationalism and a perception of common enemies.
India's relationship with Israel has significantly evolved since the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992, expanding into defense, security, intelligence, and technology sectors. This convergence is driven by mutual strategic interests and a gradual shift in India's stance on the Palestinian issue, making ties with Israel more prominent in its foreign policy. According to Mohamed Ayoub, Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University, India's decision not to join the walkout during Benjamin Netanyahu's UN General Assembly speech in September highlighted this pivot. Once a staunch defender of Palestinian rights, India now offers only nominal support for a stalled two-state solution while fostering a deepening strategic partnership with Israel. Even the devastation in Gaza, with over 74,000 Palestinian deaths and widespread displacement described by UN officials as potential ethnic cleansing, has not deterred this growing closeness.
Historically, India opposed the creation of a Jewish state, viewing it through the lens of its own struggle against British rule and as another settler-colonial project. Mahatma Gandhi famously stated in 1938 that "Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English." India voted against the UN partition plan in 1947, partly due to its own experience with partition on religious grounds. While India recognized Israel in 1950, full diplomatic relations were only established in 1992 under a Congress-led government. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the US's unipolar moment, India's economic liberalization, and emerging Arab-Israeli peace initiatives prompted this reevaluation.
Ayoub notes that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) inherited this pragmatic opening and infused it with ideological warmth and strategic substance. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, cooperation with Israel has become openly celebrated, culminating in a "special strategic partnership" in February 2026, during Modi's visit to Israel shortly before the Iran war began. Modi's embrace of Netanyahu drew criticism in India, seen by some as endorsing a US-Israeli stance against Iran. Ayoub suggests that Hindu nationalism, central to the BJP's ideology, and Zionism share a majoritarian understanding of nationalism, where the state primarily belongs to a historically defined religious majority. Israel offers Hindu nationalists an attractive model of military strength and ethno-religious dominance, a contrast to earlier Indian leaders' concerns about similarities with Pakistan.
The perception of shared enemies, particularly "Islamic armed organizations," also fuels this convergence, framing disparate conflicts as a common struggle. Ayoub cautions that while "terrorism" is a genuine concern, defining adversaries primarily by their Muslim identity obscures fundamental differences between Kashmiri separatism and Palestinian nationalism. Furthermore, as India sought closer ties with the US post-Cold War, friendship with Israel seemed to generate goodwill. The partnership is fundamentally driven by military and strategic factors, with Israel providing advanced equipment and adaptable technologies. Between 2021 and 2025, India was Israel's largest buyer of major arms, accounting for 29% of its exports, including Heron drones and Phalcon AWACS. Military cooperation extends to joint weapons development, such as the MR-SAM air defense system.
Intelligence cooperation has a longer, quieter history, with alleged contacts between Indian and Mossad intelligence wings predating diplomatic normalization. The 2026 agenda includes cybersecurity, AI, semiconductors, and joint research. These links create institutional interests that transcend political changes. The ethical question for many in India is why strategic cooperation should dilute its stance on Palestinian rights. Ayoub concludes that while India and Israel are practical partners, they remain "heterogeneous allies" when measured against India's founding promise of equal citizenship and anti-colonialism. The core contradiction lies in how India's ruling conception of nationalism has diverged from the principles that once linked Palestinian freedom to its own.
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