IDF Reveals War Lessons Three Years After October 7
Translated & summarized from Kan News by baba
Three years after the October 7th attacks, the IDF reports that reserve soldiers are serving significantly longer hours than planned, despite efforts to expand the reserve force. The military has detailed extensive operations and casualties, while also outlining significant reforms in intelligence and readiness to prevent future failures. The effectiveness of these changes will be measured by the military's response to warnings and its ability to act decisively.
The story in 7 lines · by baba
- Reserve soldiers are serving 80-100 days annually, far exceeding the planned 55 days, three years after October 7.
- The IDF reserve force has grown by 36% since the war began, with 22,000 soldiers recalled from exemption.
- The military reported attacking approximately 100,000 targets across all fronts since the war started.
- Over 70% of soldiers wounded in the war have returned to service, with 970 operational fatalities reported.
- Reforms in military intelligence aim to prioritize early warnings and encourage skepticism over reassuring assessments.
- IDF readiness levels have been significantly increased across air, ground, and reserve forces.
- The IDF questions how long the current heavy burden on reservists can be sustained.
Three years after the October 7th attacks, the Israeli military (IDF) has released data indicating it is far from returning to routine. Reserve soldiers are serving an average of 80 to 100 days per year, significantly exceeding the planned 55 days, despite a 36% increase in the reserve force since the war began. This extended service impacts soldiers' families, workplaces, and lives. Approximately 22,000 soldiers were recalled from exemption in August 2024, and new units have been established, with discharged soldiers being integrated into reserve units. However, these expansions are insufficient to meet the current service demands.
The IDF reported extensive operations across various fronts over the past three years, including approximately 100,000 targets attacked: 65,000 in Gaza, 28,000 in Lebanon and Syria, and 4,500 in Iran. In the West Bank, around 45,000 wanted individuals were apprehended or detained, and over 3,800 weapons were seized. The military also reported 970 operational fatalities, with over 70% of wounded soldiers returning to service.
In response to the failures leading to the October 7th attack, the IDF is implementing changes, particularly within military intelligence. The focus is shifting towards early warnings of enemy readiness, reducing emphasis on assessing enemy intentions and 'reassuring signs.' A multi-theater warning center has been established, and a greater emphasis is placed on heeding information that contradicts prevailing assessments and encouraging skepticism and debate. The connection between observation and intelligence is also being strengthened through enhanced training for visual intelligence analysts.
Other changes include a quadrupling of Air Force readiness levels compared to pre-war levels, with some sectors seeing a sixfold increase. Ground forces' authorities have been expanded, and border defense fire plans have been developed. Overall, the IDF has more than doubled its readiness and reserves. In the south, about 40 outposts have been established, and in the north, the number of defense personnel in communities has tripled. Rapid response units have been formed, and a new division, Gilad, has been established on the eastern border. The stated principle is to position forces ahead of communities and prepare for surprise attacks.
While these changes are significant, the IDF acknowledges that new units and orders alone do not guarantee the failure has been rectified. The true test will be the military's ability to heed unusual warnings, respond quickly, and for commanders to act even when the situation is unclear. The article concludes by questioning who will bear the burden of these ongoing missions and for how long this heavy load can be placed on reservists.
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