Beyond Warnings: Failures Preceding October 7th Examined

Recent revelations suggest that information reached the Prime Minister before October 7th, but the core failure extends beyond whether a direct warning was delivered. The critical issue lies in why accumulated warnings and signs did not prompt a reassessment of the assumption that Hamas was deterred and unwilling to wage war. The article questions who was responsible for connecting these pieces of information and bringing them to discussion.

Prior to October 7th, Israel operated under the assumption that Hamas prioritized maintaining its rule and economic benefits over conflict. This policy, which included Qatari funding, work permits, and economic easing, influenced the questions posed to intelligence agencies and the interpretation of incoming data. This created a closed loop where policy framed intelligence assessments, and intelligence assessments seemingly validated the policy.

Messages from Egypt and the UAE, potentially aimed at advancing a settlement with Hamas, could have been misinterpreted as warnings of escalation if demands weren't met, rather than as direct threats of attack. Similarly, intelligence and political echelons struggled to believe that Yahya Sinwar would signal an attack whose success depended on surprise, leading to his threats being dismissed as bluster. However, as messages and warnings from Aman (IDF Directorate of Military Intelligence) about eroding deterrence accumulated, the fundamental question should have shifted from Hamas's demands to avoid escalation, to whether the assumption of Hamas's desire for a settlement still held true.

The article draws a parallel to September 25, 1973, when King Hussein secretly warned Golda Meir of Syrian military preparations for war. Despite this, intelligence assessments continued to interpret Arab military movements through the existing paradigm, highlighting a systemic inability to challenge established assumptions, not a lack of information.

For October 7th, the failures appear to include not only misinterpretation but also the non-delivery of some warning messages to relevant professional bodies. The article stresses the Prime Minister's responsibility in formulating national intelligence assessments, as he receives input from intelligence agencies and privy to diplomatic information unavailable to them. It argues for a mechanism to ensure that sensitive security information received through foreign leaders or secret channels is documented and shared with professional bodies for analysis, and that significant discrepancies prompt a re-evaluation of policy assumptions.

Moving forward, a state commission of inquiry is needed to determine responsibility and establish systemic reforms. This includes clarifying the political echelon's responsibility towards intelligence agencies, defining national intelligence priorities and strategic warnings for the cabinet, and mandating procedures for documenting and transferring security information received by ministers. An independent body for national intelligence assessment is also proposed to integrate organizational assessments, highlight disputes, and connect secret diplomatic information to the overall picture, ensuring the Prime Minister remains accountable but not solely responsible for integration.