IDF Awards Soldier Who Warned of Hamas Attack Before October 7
Translated & summarized from Vesty by baba
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- IDF servicewoman V. awarded for prior warnings about Hamas attack.
- Her intelligence was initially dismissed by command before October 7th.
- Chief of Staff Zamir highlighted the need for open communication in the military.
- An army investigation confirmed V.'s efforts to alert commanders.
- The award occurred during a meeting on lessons learned from October 7th.
The Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, awarded a distinction to servicewoman V. on Sunday, October 4th. V., a senior warrant officer in Unit 8200, had warned before the October 7th massacre that Hamas was preparing for a large-scale surprise attack, but her conclusions did not convince the command. The award ceremony took place during a meeting focused on the findings of investigations into the October 7th events and the implementation of lessons learned.
Zamir described V. as an example of professionalism and courage in thinking, emphasizing that commanders should encourage free expression and not suppress critical approaches or subordinates' desire to say only what superiors want to hear. An army investigation found that V. had done everything possible to alert military intelligence and Southern Command commanders to the threat. However, her assessments were dismissed, with Hamas's preparations being viewed merely as force buildup rather than an immediate threat, as she insisted.
In September 2023, a month before the attack, her commander P. had also used a visit by senior Southern Command officials to warn them about Hamas's plan. V.'s conclusions were based on a correlation between Hamas exercises and an attack plan she translated into Hebrew, codenamed "Jericho Wall," a 2022 Hamas plan to seize Israeli border communities with Gaza. As early as April 2022, while monitoring Hamas forces and operational plans, she had attempted to warn of the danger.
In 2023, V. was involved in restoring tactical material monitoring in Unit 8200, initially focusing on the Nukhba forces Hamas intended to use on the front lines. The head of intelligence for the Gaza Division, who was head of intelligence for the Gaza Division on October 7th, suggested studying not only the defensive actions of these units but also their offensive preparations. V. was assigned to this work. The head of intelligence for the Gaza Division's name was cleared for publication only this month.
On July 11, 2023, V. informed colleagues about exercises held on May 25th, where two Nukhba companies, observed by senior officials, practiced a large-scale raid. The scenario included downing a fighter jet, destroying a responding Black Hawk helicopter, killing its survivors, and then targeting a Yasur-2000 helicopter carrying a rescue team, resulting in all onboard fatalities. The participants also trained to seize a kibbutz and a military college, with orders to kill all cadets. V. noted that the militants used the same religious chant that began the large-scale attack plan.
Despite V.'s persistent warnings, a discussion on the early warning system for raids within the Gaza Division on September 26th did not include her. Before the discussion, she warned that only four exercises had been fully analyzed, with about 90% of materials undergoing only initial listening, likely due to staff shortages. V. and her commander wrote that the exercises confirmed the plan's readiness, having been practiced. They also warned that intelligence sources might not provide sufficient early warning. However, other Gaza Division intelligence personnel interpreted the same materials as routine training for the distant future.
The "October Council," representing former hostages and families of victims, claims the head of intelligence for the Gaza Division was among the commanders who ignored V.'s warnings. The organization accused him of trying to conceal his identity and continue his career despite the disaster. They demand a state commission of inquiry, to be established after the elections, to examine his actions.
Zamir stated at the meeting that the army is finalizing its investigations into the October 7th failure, stressing the need to comprehend the scale of the catastrophe, implement lessons, and move forward. He identified increasing the army's resilience and forming forces capable of confronting threats on multiple fronts as key lessons, calling the IDF's size its strategic depth. Zamir added that the army's strategy centers on readiness for sudden war and preventing major threats at their inception. He emphasized that during this tense period, every commander must maintain readiness, with the army tasked with simultaneously preventing and preparing for surprise attacks.
The meeting also presented a plan for further war investigations, with dedicated teams. In the coming months, Zamir will chair training events and discussions on the progress of these investigations.
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