Hamas Deception Strategy Lulled Israel into False Sense of Security Before Oct. 7

Hamas systematically cultivated a false sense of calm in Israel for years, transforming genuine signs of impending attack into routine occurrences, according to an investigation by journalists Ronen Bergman and Yuval Rabinovich. The organization implemented a large-scale disinformation campaign designed to convince Israel that no major offensive was being prepared. Hamas intentionally revealed some of its military activities, anticipating that Israeli security forces would become accustomed to these alarming signals and cease to perceive them as indicators of an imminent threat.

The foundations of this strategy were laid as early as 2016-2017, with Hamas internal documents calling for a comprehensive disinformation plan to ensure the element of surprise. Hamas leadership understood that completely concealing military preparations was nearly impossible, given Israel's intelligence capabilities. Therefore, the group aimed to ensure that any detected activity would be misinterpreted. Regular unit movements and military exercises were deliberately repeated to desensitize Israeli observers, so that similar activities during actual preparations would be dismissed as mere training.

Later, Hamas escalated to conducting overt drills, which were filmed and disseminated through affiliated channels. This public display was intended to project an image of a show of force rather than practical preparation for invasion. However, the training scenarios closely mirrored elements of the future attack, including breaching defenses, capturing kibbutzim, abducting people, and conducting rocket barrages, as practiced in May and June 2023. Hamas monitored Israeli reactions to these exercises, noting no significant increase in IDF readiness, according to internal documents.

Concurrently, Hamas projected an image of prioritizing governance in Gaza, seeking economic concessions, and avoiding large-scale war. In 2018, Yahya Sinwar conveyed a message of "calculated risk" to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu via Egyptian mediators, while simultaneously developing attack plans. Qatari funds flowing into Gaza and ongoing negotiations further reinforced the perception that Hamas was focused on economic stability and relative quiet. Sinwar himself publicly supported this narrative, stating in a 2018 interview that a new war was not in Hamas's interest and expressing readiness to observe a ceasefire under certain conditions.

Underground infrastructure also played a role. While Israel focused on its underground barrier, Hamas may have used continued tunnel construction to divert Israeli attention from preparations for a mass ground assault. The scale of the planned invasion was also significantly underestimated by the IDF, which anticipated only a few small raids, while Hamas prepared 24 assault companies totaling approximately 2,400 militants. Despite internal warnings from IDF personnel, including a member of Unit 8200 who analyzed the "Jericho Wall" plan and noted its correlation with Hamas exercises, the prevailing assessment within intelligence structures continued to view observed activity as routine.

In the weeks leading up to October 7, Hamas employed additional tactics to foster a false sense of stability. Allowing some senior political figures to travel abroad suggested a lack of imminent war preparations. Border disturbances in August and September were largely attributed to Hamas's pursuit of economic concessions. Agreements reached on September 29, mediated by Egypt and Qatar, led to a cessation of these disturbances, further solidifying the belief that Hamas had achieved its objectives and was not interested in major escalation. Consequently, numerous warning signs were observed and recorded by Israel but were interpreted through the lens of a pre-existing understanding of Hamas's intentions. One source described the disinformation system as a "virus" that influenced not only the interpretation of intelligence but also the decisions based upon it.