New Revelations Detail Hamas Deception and Israeli Intelligence Failures Before Oct. 7

A series of new revelations, initially sparked by an "Haaretz" investigation three weeks ago, shed light on critical events preceding the October 7th Hamas attacks. While it remains unclear if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the security establishment received a concrete warning of the surprise assault, the publications expose the depth of the political and security echelons' misconception and how Hamas's deception operation completely blinded Netanyahu. Netanyahu's claim of advocating a more aggressive policy than suggested by the security echelon has also been refuted for now.

Key details emerging include a message from Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, conveyed via former Fatah official Soufian Abu Zaida to UAE leader Mohammed bin Zayed, warning of an "earthquake" for Israel. Bin Zayed reportedly relayed this to Israel on September 15th to the head of the Shin Bet and in a 45-minute encrypted call with Netanyahu later that month. Netanyahu's office has denied this call occurred. According to reports, Netanyahu did not pass this information to the security establishment. Later, bin Zayed discussed the warning with the CIA chief, describing it as a general alert about potential violence.

Further reports indicate that Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel visited Israel on September 26th to warn of an escalation in Gaza, stating Hamas was preparing a significant attack and urging Israel to provide economic concessions. Flight data confirmed his plane's arrival. Documents from the final two weeks before October 7th show that on September 27th, Netanyahu was advised to reduce escalation and increase humanitarian aid, including the entry of workers. A meeting on October 1st focused on the Saudi deal, with Netanyahu opposing strikes on Hamas officials involved in West Bank incitement, prioritizing quiet in Gaza partly due to fears of jeopardizing Saudi normalization talks.

These revelations underscore the strategic implications, reinforcing criticism of the political and security leadership, particularly Prime Minister Netanyahu, regarding the pre-attack mindset and the profound failure of October 7th. They also highlight the extensive communication between Hamas and the Israeli government before the massacre. The Israeli leadership was fully ensnared by Hamas's deception, interpreting received information within the framework Hamas sought to establish: that the organization desired stability and economic improvement in Gaza. This narrative, built on years of short conflicts, indirect negotiations, and stabilization through financial aid and concessions, framed how intelligence was processed. Netanyahu's reported reluctance to decide on assassinating Hamas officials shortly before the attack positions him not just as a participant but as a key architect of this approach. The ongoing drip of information, through various sources and at their chosen times, continues to shape the public's understanding of the October 7th failure, with a full public inquiry yet to occur.