Hamas Deception Campaign Foiled Israeli Intelligence Before Oct. 7 Attack

A Ynet investigation reveals Hamas meticulously deceived Israel for years, lulling its military and political leadership into a false sense of security to conceal preparations for the October 7th massacre. The report, based on Hamas documents and Israeli internal investigations, details a sophisticated strategy of misdirection, akin to the boy who cried wolf, but with deliberate intent to desensitize Israel to genuine threats.

A secret "narrow military council" convened by Yahya Sinwar in January 2023, known as the "Great Project," was the sole forum for discussing the planned attack. Minutes from this council, partially captured during the Gaza conflict, indicate a mood of optimism fueled by Israel's new government. Hamas decided to halt smaller provocations, like rocket fire, to "put Israel to sleep," while also planning to "swallow" Israeli responses to Gaza to avoid escalation. They believed the Netanyahu government's actions would help mobilize the "axis of resistance" and Arab populations, aiming for a combined attack from within and outside Israel.

Hamas's deception strategy, developed since at least 2016, focused on "misleading" rather than outright concealment, acknowledging Israel's advanced intelligence capabilities. The tactic involved creating both false confidence and uncertainty. This included staging frequent, seemingly routine drills that desensitized the IDF to actual Hamas movements. Conversely, they also conducted loud, public exercises to create a false impression of mere posturing, while actual training involved simulated attacks, hostage-taking, and simulated destruction of Israeli military assets.

The "settlement" narrative, promoted by Hamas, was a key element of their deception. By appearing to prioritize Gaza's well-being and economic prosperity, Hamas sought to gain time and resources, including Qatari funding, which Israel's leadership, particularly under Netanyahu, found convenient for maintaining stability and preventing a wider conflict. This narrative was reinforced by Hamas leaders, including Sinwar, who gave interviews portraying themselves as responsible rulers seeking quiet, while simultaneously planning the attack. The article highlights the "calculated risk" note Sinwar sent to Netanyahu, which was interpreted by Israel as a sign of de-escalation, not as a prelude to war.

Further deception involved the ongoing construction of tunnels. While Israel invested heavily in detecting cross-border tunnels, Hamas continued digging approach tunnels, drawing Israeli attention and resources away from potential surface breaches. Hamas also staged large-scale exercises, like "Jericho Wall" and "Unwavering Pillar - 4," which were misinterpreted by Israeli intelligence as either routine drills, demonstrations of force, or preparations for conflict in the West Bank, rather than a direct assault on Gaza border communities.

In the final weeks before the attack, Hamas employed tactics like allowing political leaders to travel abroad, which Israel saw as a sign of de-escalation. Renewed border disturbances were interpreted as pressure for economic concessions, which were subsequently granted, further reinforcing the belief that Hamas had no motivation for war. Despite some intelligence warnings, particularly from a female intelligence officer, the prevailing view within the IDF and among political leaders was that the risk in Gaza was manageable, and that the "settlement" was genuine, the drills were for show, and Qatari money had bought quiet.