Revelations Emerge Before Election, Blaming Netanyahu for October 7th Failures
Translated & summarized from Maariv by baba
A wave of "revelations" has emerged shortly before Israeli elections, suggesting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was warned about the October 7th attack but ignored intelligence. The author criticizes the timing and suggests these disclosures aim to assign blame to Netanyahu, questioning the effectiveness of intelligence and the process for determining responsibility.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- New "revelations" suggest Netanyahu ignored warnings before October 7th.
- Disclosures are strategically timed to influence upcoming Israeli elections.
- The author questions the effectiveness of intelligence and the blame assignment process.
- A simpler inquiry by ordinary citizens is proposed to determine responsibility.
- The timing of the revelations is linked to the election cycle.
As Israel approaches a pivotal election, a wave of "revelations" has surfaced, suggesting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was warned about the impending disaster of October 7th but ignored the intelligence. These disclosures, originating from various sources including the UAE and Egypt, are presented as aiming to shape public opinion by focusing on past failures and attributing blame to Netanyahu.
The author, attorney Michael Kleiner, frames these revelations as strategically timed to influence the upcoming vote, contrasting the upcoming Simchat Torah holiday with the somber mood following the October 7th massacre. He notes that the election is perceived as more critical than ever, forcing voters to choose between looking at the past or the future when casting their single ballot.
Kleiner suggests that these "revelations," meticulously gathered over nearly three years by American and Israeli journalists, are designed to create a narrative of "Benjamin's guilt." He criticizes Netanyahu's opposition to a state inquiry commission, accusing him of cynically exploiting the left's opposition to a potentially biased commission chair. The author posits that a simpler, more direct approach, perhaps a jury of ordinary Israelis, would be sufficient to determine responsibility for the failures.
The article questions the timing and nature of these disclosures, particularly referencing a reported trip by Netanyahu to the UAE to allegedly ask Emir Mohammed bin Zayed to deny warning him about a Hamas attack. Kleiner also raises doubts about the effectiveness of intelligence if it did not lead to preventative actions, such as evacuating the Nova festival or alerting the Prime Minister, even if warnings were received from sources like Yahya Sinwar or through intelligence channels regarding Hamas's intentions.
Kleiner concludes by emphasizing that understanding the scale of the October 7th massacre hinges on the element of surprise achieved by the enemy. He implies that the current legal proceedings and the ongoing debate over responsibility are complex, suggesting that a more straightforward examination of the facts by a panel of ordinary citizens, guided by a judge, would be more effective in uncovering the truth.
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