Israeli Experts Simulate Election Interference Scenarios

Israeli security, technology, legal, media, and civil society experts recently participated in a simulation exercise to prepare for potential attempts to illegally influence upcoming Knesset elections. Organized by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), the Israel Internet Association, and the Shomron Center at Tel Aviv University, the event aimed to identify risks, practice decision-making, and explore response strategies.

Participants divided potential threats into three categories: pre-election interference, actions on election day, and post-election challenges. Pre-election tactics discussed included disseminating biased polls as "leaks" or promoting parties through paid blog posts disguised as personal opinions. On election day, scenarios involved flooding social media with a mix of real and fake news, potentially using AI-generated deepfakes to suppress turnout in specific areas, or overwhelming emergency phone lines. Post-election threats focused on the spread of "evidence of fraud" online, foreign interference aimed at creating chaos, and the possibility of a party refusing to accept the results.

Tamir Hayman, Director of INSS and former head of military intelligence, stated that the current elections are seen as a "decisive battle" likely to face influence attempts from various actors, including adversaries aware of internal Israeli divisions. Former senior officials from the Shin Bet, National Security Council, and other agencies played roles simulating current officeholders, while a retired judge acted as the Central Elections Committee (CEC) chairman.

Discussions also covered the role of social media platforms, with a former TikTok and Meta executive suggesting the CEC should maintain constant communication with platforms that often have their own rules for content moderation. Idan Ring of the Israel Internet Association highlighted the high digital engagement of Israelis and the low readiness of legislative bodies to counter online manipulation, while also cautioning that discussions of foreign interference could themselves be used to delegitimize results.

Proposed solutions included preemptive meetings with social media and AI companies, establishing a professional CEC press service to liaise with security forces and the public, and deploying CEC representatives to major media outlets on election day to counter rumors. Concerns were also raised about non-digital interference, such as deliberately slowing down voting at polling stations or issues with counting absentee ballots, with suggestions to move the ballot count to a neutral location. Experts debated the best approach to discussing the potential refusal to accept election results, with some advocating for a strong public stance against it and others warning that excessive focus could amplify conspiracy theories.

Representatives from the CEC's special task force on illegal election influence observed the simulation and plan to incorporate its findings into their preparedness efforts. The final report emphasized that election security extends beyond physical polling stations and counting systems to encompass the information voters receive and their trust in the electoral process.