Netanyahu Accused of Distorting Facts on October 7th Failures

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly using selectively released security information to shape the narrative surrounding the October 7th Hamas attacks and the events leading up to them. A document prepared in December 2025, and approved by Netanyahu for publication, allegedly quotes security officials to support his thesis that the security establishment favored quiet while he advocated for escalation. For instance, a quote from former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, expressing pessimism about an offensive operation, was published by the Likud campaign with the words "with sorrow" and any mention of normalization with Saudi Arabia omitted. Netanyahu's own statements from the same discussion, which reportedly favored advancing a deal with Hamas, were not presented to the state comptroller.

Furthermore, an announcement attributed to Netanyahu and circulated to reporters and on social media claimed that on the night of October 7th, Ronen Bar held "many conversations" with then-IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and head of Military Intelligence Aharon Haliva about "all the signs." However, the article asserts this is factually incorrect, stating Halevi and Bar did not speak directly that night. Communication occurred through their offices, but it was far from "many conversations" or a discussion of "all the signs." An update from Bar's aide to Halevi's aide at 1:46 AM detailed indications received, followed by situation assessments within the military and Shin Bet. These assessments, while noting unusual signs, concluded that the situation on the ground indicated normalcy and not an imminent attack, explaining why the Prime Minister was not alerted.

This selective release of information is particularly concerning as Netanyahu is reportedly aware of the accurate details, which are documented in military and Shin Bet investigations presented to the public. The article suggests that during a campaign period, such tactics are permissible. The constant stream of reports about warnings and conversations serves to obscure the broader picture: for years, while Hamas developed its plan to overwhelm Gaza's defenses and strike deep into Israel, Israel prioritized a policy of de-escalation in Gaza, focusing on internal issues and normalization. The partially published protocols aim to distort this reality by using incomplete quotes to suggest events unfolded differently than they did, while the "archive", both within the Prime Minister's office and in media records, remembers the full truth.