Netanyahu and Ex-Shin Bet Chief Clash Over Pre-Oct. 7 Warnings

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar are engaged in a fierce public dispute over what each knew and recommended before the October 7th Hamas attacks. Netanyahu accused Bar of "failures and crimes," alleging that Bar knew of a "real danger" on the night of the massacre but failed to update him. In an unusual response, Bar announced his intention to sue Netanyahu for defamation, claiming the Prime Minister is selectively and manipulatively releasing documents and protocols from security discussions.

Central to the dispute are 55 pages of documents Netanyahu released in February, which he claims are part of his response to the State Comptroller's investigation. These documents contain quotes from security discussions, but critics argue that Netanyahu selectively published excerpts, omitting full transcripts and thus distorting the context. One key example is a meeting on October 1, 2023, six days before the attack. Netanyahu's advisor, Topaz Luk, highlighted a quote from Bar suggesting a focus on humanitarian issues and caution against initiating action. However, investigative reports suggest Bar also stated that Hamas leader Sinwar felt strong and that an operational plan for Gaza was needed, with the IDF Chief of Staff requesting a broad campaign.

Further reporting indicates that Bar's full statement in the October 1st meeting included a request to advance a plan to assassinate both Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, a plan known as "double rights." This detail was reportedly omitted from the excerpts Netanyahu released. While the meeting summary from Netanyahu's office mentioned directives for humanitarian benefits and civilian arrangements with Hamas, it also included instructions for "operational readiness for recommended assassinations," particularly concerning Hamas leadership.

Bar's account, detailed in a High Court petition filed in April 2025, claims the Shin Bet repeatedly warned the political echelon throughout 2023 that Israel's internal divisions created a "window of opportunity" for enemies, potentially leading to a "perfect storm." He asserted that as early as April, he recommended a "targeted, assertive move" to restore deterrence. A previous report also stated that in July 2023, Bar warned Netanyahu of an impending "war" due to perceived internal Israeli weakness, a message later conveyed to opposition leader Yair Lapid with Netanyahu's approval. However, this was not a specific intelligence warning of a Hamas attack on October 7th, but rather a broader concern about a multi-front escalation, particularly involving Hezbollah and the West Bank.

Bar himself acknowledged a Shin Bet failure, stating in an internal letter after the attack that the organization "did not manage to produce sufficient warning to thwart the attack," taking personal responsibility. He noted that while Shin Bet alerted IDF officials to anomalies by 10:00 PM on October 6th and issued a warning about Hamas's "unusual preparations and possibility of offensive intentions" at 3:03 AM, the intelligence was misinterpreted as Hamas anticipating Israeli action or preparing for a limited raid, not a large-scale strategic assault. Bar also stated he instructed his office to update the Prime Minister's military secretary at 5:15 AM, but Netanyahu reportedly received his first call from his military secretary only at 6:29 AM, after the attack had already begun.

The article concludes that the available public information does not support a simple narrative of one side seeking quiet and the other seeking attack. Both Shin Bet and Netanyahu's office engaged in policies that included both de-escalation and preparations for offensive actions. The full, unredacted protocols are necessary for a comprehensive understanding of who said what, what decisions were made, and who was responsible.