Israel's 'Trap of 61' Threatens Government Stability Ahead of Elections
With 40 days until the 26th Knesset elections, Israel faces a persistent challenge in forming stable, functioning governments, a problem expert Muhammad Watad likens to a cracked pitcher that cannot hold water. This "paradox of Israeli governability" stems from structural issues within the legal and political system, leading to prolonged institutional deadlock. Two primary election scenarios present significant hurdles: a right-religious bloc victory (61-62 seats) could lead to a government highly dependent on individual lawmakers or small factions, granting them "veto power" over crucial decisions. Conversely, a victory for the opposing bloc (61-63 seats) would struggle with a lack of ideological cohesion, potentially relying on Arab factions whose differing views on foreign and security policy complicate decision-making.
Internal shifts within political blocs exacerbate instability. The Orthodox bloc is no longer monolithic, with internal tensions and demographic changes affecting coalition negotiations. The Arab bloc, often a forced electoral alliance, can fragment into disparate factions with opposing views post-election. Even a national unity government, historically, has faced paralysis due to parity mechanisms and prime ministerial rotation models.
Constitutional mechanisms further threaten coalition stability. Challenges include maintaining coalition discipline, potential clashes with the judiciary, and crucially, Basic Law: The Knesset's Article 36-Aleph, which mandates automatic Knesset dissolution if the budget is not approved by a set deadline. This article can be weaponized by coalition partners to collapse a government without a direct no-confidence vote.
To address these issues, proposed reforms include streamlining government formation by automatically appointing a party leader as prime minister, strengthening the constructive no-confidence vote to require a supermajority and an alternative budget, and introducing incentives for pre-election alliances. Other suggestions involve electoral reforms like a mixed regional-proportional system, open ballots, and adjusting the electoral threshold. Strengthening Knesset oversight through measures like the "Norwegian Law" and increasing the number of lawmakers are also considered. Some propose a presidential or semi-presidential system with directly elected leaders.
International models offer insights: Germany's strict constructive no-confidence vote and electoral threshold, New Zealand's "confidence and supply" agreements, and Spain's requirement for an alternative candidate have fostered greater stability. To overcome the "trap of 61," a "delayed implementation" mechanism for constitutional reforms is suggested, ensuring changes take effect only in subsequent Knesset terms, removing immediate political self-interest. The article concludes by advocating for the President to initiate a "constitutional modernization roundtable" to forge a "charter of constitutional stability" through broad consensus on reforms, emphasizing that long-term vision, not just election day majorities, will define Israel's future.
