Rabbi Joel Ben-Nun surveys Israel’s wars from the 1948 War of Independence to the present and argues that each brought major military gains but also left some goals unmet. He says there is no reason to blame leaders for failing to reach total victory, because that has been the pattern throughout Israel’s history.
He says the 1948 war began with Palestinian terror after the UN vote for two states, then widened into a full war with Arab armies after Israel’s declaration of independence. Israel survived, pushed back invading forces, and signed armistice agreements, but did not win Arab recognition. He also says Israel linked up with Jerusalem, while the Old City, Atarot, Neve Yaakov and Gush Etzion remained under Jordanian control. Later retaliatory raids hit terror bases backed by Egypt and Jordan, but only the 1956 Sinai campaign brought 11 years of calm, followed by an Israeli withdrawal without meaningful gains.
Ben-Nun says the Six-Day War came amid an Israeli economic crisis and a mistaken assumption that Egypt was tied down in Yemen. It produced national unity, removed threats from Egypt, Jordan and Syria, reunited Jerusalem, and gave Israel control of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. He adds that even this did not bring peace recognition, and the War of Attrition soon followed along the Jordan Valley and the Suez Canal. The Yom Kippur War, he says, began with a grave intelligence failure, cost Israel much of the Golan and the canal fort line at first, then ended in a major victory. Egypt shifted to diplomacy and recognized Israel in exchange for full withdrawal from Sinai, while Syria accepted only a ceasefire.
He says the Lebanon wars drove Yasser Arafat out of Lebanon and reduced Palestinian terror from that front, but helped create stronger Shiite terror backed by Syria and later Iran. The Second Intifada, which he dates to Rosh Hashanah, forced Israel to tighten control in Judea and Samaria without ending Palestinian attacks. He then describes the Oct. 7 war, which he calls the eighth war of independence, as a shocking attack on communities in the Gaza envelope that shattered the idea of land-for-peace, sparked remarkable civilian and military mobilization, and left the IDF controlling most of Gaza, though not defeating Hamas because of American pressure and Qatar. He says later phases, named “With a Lion” and “Roar of the Lion,” brought major strikes on Iran and a renewed security zone in southern Lebanon, but still no complete victory, again because of the Americans and their ties to mediators, especially Qatar. Ben-Nun concludes that Israel’s deep internal split helped cause the Oct. 7 war, and that although the fighting created combat unity, it did not produce a national unity government.
