Iran and Foreign Powers Target Israeli Elections Through Sophisticated Influence Campaigns

Shin Bet chief David Zini warned in a confidential Knesset briefing on Monday that Iran, along with Russia, China, and Turkey, is actively attempting to interfere in Israel's upcoming elections. While direct hacking of voting systems remains a threat, the primary tactic involves sophisticated influence operations designed to shape Israeli public opinion, voter turnout, and acceptance of election results. Iranian intelligence operatives create fake social media accounts that appear Israeli, impersonating activists across the political spectrum to amplify divisive messages and deepen societal rifts. These networks can rapidly spread videos, rumors, and calls for protests, which are then shared by genuine Israelis, journalists, and politicians, obscuring the foreign origin of the content.

A recent State Comptroller report confirmed foreign impersonation activities on platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, X, and WhatsApp during previous elections. Iran exploits Israel's internal polarization to encourage friction and escalate tensions from online spaces to the streets. The Shin Bet has exposed Iranian platforms recruiting citizens for seemingly benign tasks that can later escalate to intelligence gathering or more serious operations. Russia employs a broader, industrialized approach, using thousands of fake accounts, counterfeit news sites, and rapid dissemination of false or distorted information to exacerbate divisions and undermine trust in Israeli institutions. Chinese influence efforts, typically more patient and subtle, involve fake local accounts and AI tools to gather data on divisive issues and promote messages aligned with Beijing's interests, though specific Chinese activities related to the Israeli elections have not yet been disclosed.

Artificial intelligence expands these countries' capabilities, enabling the creation of fabricated audio, video, and documents that can mislead voters even if later debunked. Cyberattacks also pose risks, including phishing attempts targeting candidates and journalists, account takeovers, and disinformation campaigns aimed at suppressing voter turnout by spreading false information about polling locations or security threats. Post-election, foreign actors may disseminate claims of fraud or hacking to erode confidence in the results. Covert funding through organizations and influencers further complicates the landscape by promoting candidates or agendas aligned with foreign interests without revealing their origin.

Despite these threats, Israeli security agencies face challenges in distinguishing legitimate political discourse from foreign interference, especially given the absence of a coordinated national policy or a centralized governmental body to address digital foreign influence as of March 2026. Zini emphasized that the battle extends beyond securing polling stations to controlling the narrative about what Israelis debate, whom they trust, and whether they accept the election outcome.