Lieberman's Dilemma: All Paths Lead Back to Netanyahu

Avigdor Lieberman has declared a series of "no's" regarding potential government formations, refusing to join a government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, even at the cost of foregoing the prime minister role in a rotation. He also opposes a minority government and is unwilling to rely on Arab parties. Lieberman's strategy hinges on the belief that the Netanyahu bloc will fracture before his own bloc seeking change disintegrates. If successful, he could be a key player in a change of government. However, if his gamble fails, Netanyahu might remain prime minister.

Lieberman acknowledges his "no's" do not constitute a majority, positioning his statements as an attempt to shift pressure onto others, including Likud members, ultra-Orthodox parties, and his "change bloc" partners. His message is that any party seeking a government must operate within his stipulated boundaries. This stance also serves to explain a disappointing election result to his voters, attributing the failure to Izencoat's focus on a minority government, which he claims alienated right-wing voters.

Despite his rejections, Lieberman announced he would recommend Izencoat for prime minister, allowing Izencoat to attempt forming a government without Lieberman's prior commitment to his proposed framework. This allows Lieberman to participate if a government meeting his conditions is formed, or to distance himself if the attempt fails, framing it as avoiding a risky political adventure.

His opposition to a minority government is also strategic, warning of its potential collapse and Netanyahu's strengthened return. However, forming a government under his conditions requires significant political maneuvering, potentially drawing members from the Likud, though no such group has publicly committed. A more tangible possibility lies with the ultra-Orthodox parties, where some voices have considered cooperation with Izencoat, with one senior figure reportedly stating that "business can be done" with Lieberman. Yet, no firm decision has been made, and the contentious issue of conscription remains unresolved.

The math for a majority government, combining the 48 mandates of the change bloc with the 13 from Shas and United Torah Judaism, totals 61. However, the political path is complex, requiring compromises on conscription and explanations to voters for any concessions made. If each side insists on its demands, the majority may remain theoretical. Lieberman's gamble appears to be that as Netanyahu fails to form a government, his partners will seek alternatives. Conversely, Netanyahu can remain in office through a caretaker government, benefiting from delays in forming a new one.

As attempts to form a change government falter, the pressure might shift, questioning why the ultra-Orthodox and Likud remain with Netanyahu, potentially turning into a question directed at Bennett and Izencoat about their unwillingness to compromise to prevent further elections. This could work against Lieberman's patience-based strategy. The gap to a majority is also significant: Netanyahu needs eight mandates, while the change bloc needs thirteen. While some Likud members have been approached, none have committed to switching sides, and some have explicitly denied any intention to do so. However, preventing an alternative to Netanyahu doesn't necessarily require forming a government under him immediately; it can be achieved by preventing the alternative from coalescing.

Long-term, Lieberman's adherence to his commitments could position him as the right-wing alternative to Netanyahu, without aligning with the left or relying on Arab parties. If others compromise and he remains outside, he could leverage this for future elections and leadership of the right. However, voters seeking change might question the utility of such loyalty if it perpetuates the current government. Ultimately, those who reject alternatives must present their own, moving beyond simply stating what they oppose to defining what they support. Lieberman's next test will be his ability to secure partners, offer compromise, and build a majority. If a deal is being brokered behind his statements, his rejections might be calculated. If he is waiting for the deadlock to resolve itself, the risk is substantial. Lieberman can afford to wait only if he believes someone else will move; Netanyahu is content if no one does, suggesting a prolonged political attrition.