Court Allows Release of IDF Officer's Identity in Gaza Division on Oct. 7

The Israeli Supreme Court on Thursday permitted the publication of the identity of the Gaza Division's intelligence officer on October 7, revealing the role was held by Lieutenant Colonel Aryeh Amidaror, son of retired General Yaakov Amidaror. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had announced two weeks prior that Amidaror was being dismissed from service.

This decision stems from a directive by IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir from last year, which assigned command responsibility for the October 7 events to several senior officers and called for disciplinary action. As the division's intelligence officer, Amidaror held command responsibility and was among those targeted for these measures.

In recent months, proceedings to end Amidaror's service have been underway. The IDF stated that all relevant considerations were examined, including the Deputy Chief of Staff's opinion, findings from investigations, and expert assessments of his performance failures prior to October 7. Amidaror's arguments regarding his level of responsibility were also considered by an advisory committee.

In March, Amidaror petitioned the court against the committee's convening, and the court ruled that it would not meet until further notice. In June, the court issued its final ruling, determining that the process to terminate Amidaror's service, initiated by the Deputy Chief of Staff's assessment of professional errors, operational failures, and command responsibility, was conducted lawfully and within full authority. The court rejected Amidaror's claims, affirming the military's right to dismiss a soldier for professional and command failures, and emphasized that the officer's right to be heard was not compromised.

Last June, the IDF published its combat investigation into the Gaza Division (Re'im base) on October 7, which resulted in the deaths of three commanders and one soldier, with seven others wounded. The report identified failures in defending the base due to inadequate preparation, insufficient protective measures and infrastructure, a defensive culture unsuited for a forward operating base, and a defense strategy that did not address these gaps.