Israel's Leaders Obligated to Know Enemy's Intentions, Regardless of Specific Warnings

Professor Arie Eldad argues that whether specific or general warnings were received before October 7th is irrelevant, as Israeli leaders have been aware for a century of the Arab enemy's intent to destroy Jews and should have acted preemptively. He draws a parallel to 1942, when survivors of the Holocaust shared their experiences, prompting a shocked reaction and the question, "Who allowed us not to know?" Eldad contends that while those opposed to Zionism could deny reality, Zionists were obligated to know the existential threat to Jews in the diaspora.

The current "media and political storm" involves reports of explicit warnings allegedly given to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by Egyptian and UAE officials before October 7th. These reports suggest that when Egyptian intelligence chief or the UAE president realized their warnings were not being properly conveyed to Netanyahu, they contacted him directly. Eldad expresses uncertainty about the veracity of these reports, suggesting they could be political propaganda. He also questions whether the warnings were precise or general, and dismisses warnings from figures like Ronen Bar, Yoav Gallant, and Herzi Halevi as "window dressing" (keshet'et). Eldad believes these officials did not truly expect an attack, clinging to the notion that Hamas was deterred and interested in a settlement, a view that suited Netanyahu's political goals.

Eldad traces this "conception" of appeasement and deterrence back through various Israeli leaders. He notes Netanyahu's past preference for a "peace" with Saudi Arabia over preemptive action in Gaza and Lebanon, and his long-standing policy of appeasing Hamas with benefits and cash to maintain quiet, believing it served Israel by preventing international pressure for a Palestinian state. This approach is compared to Ariel Sharon's disengagement from Gaza, which Eldad argues strengthened Hamas and weakened Abu Mazen, paving the way for Hamas's takeover. Similarly, Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak are criticized for "containing" terror and "deterring" Hamas with words while transferring funds to the organization.

While Netanyahu's opponents blame him, Eldad asserts that Netanyahu did not invent the "conception" but adopted security and IDF assessments uncritically, making him responsible. Supporters of Netanyahu attempt to shift blame to Sharon, or even Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. However, Eldad posits that the historical error in understanding Arabs in the land of Israel is much older, dating back to the early days of Zionism. He references Theodor Herzl's initial belief in harmonious coexistence, contrasting it with the rise of Arab nationalism and jihadist ideology. Eldad criticizes subsequent leaders, including David Ben-Gurion, for believing that economic progress would appease Arabs, even after witnessing violence. He contrasts this with Ze'ev Jabotinsky's "Iron Wall" concept, which advocated for military strength. Eldad concludes that religious and ideological motivations, such as the destruction of Israel, drive some enemies more than economic or military logic, making them unwilling to cease fighting regardless of concessions.