Israel Ignored Warnings From Egypt, UAE Before Oct. 7 Attack

As the third anniversary of the "Black Saturday" attacks approaches, questions persist regarding how Israel allowed the large-scale Hamas assault on October 7, 2023, to occur with such minimal initial resistance. While some attribute the events to conspiracy theories, a more grounded explanation suggests a failure to properly interpret and act upon intelligence, including warnings from foreign governments.

Reports indicate that prior to the October 7th attack, Israel received multiple warnings from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, in addition to internal security alerts. Egypt's intelligence service reportedly issued at least three warnings. In June 2023, Cairo alerted Israel to a dangerous deterioration of the situation around Gaza and recommended resuming negotiations with Hamas. In late September, Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel visited Israel, warning of a potential "explosion" in Gaza but without specifying the date, scale, or exact scenario of an attack. Further signals from Egypt continued up to 48 hours before the assault, though sources emphasize that Egypt itself did not know the precise details of the planned attack, making the warnings general.

The UAE also issued a warning. In September 2023, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, alerting him to signs of Hamas preparation for an attack. This warning, like Egypt's, reportedly lacked specific details regarding the timing or magnitude of the operation. The UAE's information may have originated from a former Palestinian Authority official who relayed a message from Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, suggesting a significant event by the end of September that would "cause an earthquake in negotiations" and necessitate "emptying prisons." This message, however, lacked concrete details and did not align with the attack's actual timing.

The article posits that the Israeli leadership did not react to these foreign warnings because they were too general. The volatile situation in Gaza and Hamas's desire to harm Israelis were not new concerns. The core issue, according to the analysis, was a failure in "concept", the prevailing understanding and operational framework within intelligence and political leadership. The sheer volume of information, coupled with a lack of clear priorities and a misallocation of resources, led to an underestimation of the threat from Hamas. Israel's intelligence focus was primarily on the northern border with Hezbollah, diverting attention and resources from Gaza.

Furthermore, Hamas leadership allegedly deceived Israel by signaling an interest in economic benefits and prisoner negotiations, while portraying drills of attacking Israeli communities as necessary concessions to internal pressure. To build trust, Hamas even provided intelligence on Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which Israel used in Operation "Dawn" in August 2022. This led Israeli intelligence to believe Hamas could be somewhat trusted, failing to recognize that Hamas was using Israel to eliminate its main rival.

The article draws parallels to historical intelligence failures, including the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. In each case, warnings were present but misinterpreted or underestimated due to flawed "concepts" or prevailing assumptions, leading to catastrophic consequences.