Lessons from NASA Disasters Offer Framework for Israeli Security Failures
An academic institute focused on safety within the criminal justice system is drawing parallels between NASA's space shuttle disasters and the security failures leading up to the October 7th Hamas attack. The core principle is that when mistakes can have fatal consequences, systems must be designed to account for human error, not just rely on professionals correctly assessing danger.
The institute argues that the intelligence failures preceding October 7th, despite warnings of increased escalation, mirror the "normalization of deviation" described by sociologist Diane Vaughan in relation to the Columbia shuttle disaster. This phenomenon occurs when minor system malfunctions or deviations from expected procedures occur repeatedly without catastrophic results, leading to their gradual acceptance as normal. The success of surviving previous deviations can create a false sense of security, making subsequent ones seem less risky.
Applying this to the security apparatus, the article notes that while high-quality intelligence existed, and warnings of escalation were present, the necessary actions to improve readiness were not taken. Southern Command, for instance, did not adapt forces, alert levels, or plans to the perceived threat. The author questions why defense was so dependent on the accuracy of the forecast, suggesting that even without consensus on offensive action against Hamas leadership, raising alert levels, preparing reserves, and strengthening defenses are viable protective measures.
The article proposes implementing NASA's post-Columbia safety measures, such as establishing an independent engineering and safety center and a formal mechanism for professional dissent, where disagreements are documented and escalated. It emphasizes that such mechanisms are insufficient without a safety culture that encourages reporting, fair treatment of those who raise concerns, learning, and flexibility. The key question is how individuals who bring inconvenient information are treated, as nuisances or as partners in preventing future disasters.
For the Israeli military, the suggestion is not to invent new safety bodies but to integrate these principles into the intelligence-decision-action-defense nexus. This could involve permanent teams comprising intelligence, operations, technology, and logistics personnel, alongside junior commanders, field operatives, and safety experts. These teams would examine information flow between units, identify where warnings lose impact, and understand why alerts don't translate into action. They should also analyze "near misses", incidents that were narrowly averted, to understand systemic weaknesses rather than just celebrating individual heroism. The goal is to ensure uncomfortable questions are answered and gaps are not normalized into routine.
The article concludes by linking these safety principles to the criminal justice system, where wrongful convictions can occur if investigators become fixated on a hypothesis and contradictory evidence is ignored. It advocates for a national authority for safety in the criminal justice system, inspired by similar models in medicine and aviation, to support safety teams, promote preventive methods, and monitor implementation, thereby ensuring safety is a continuous organizational commitment rather than a post-disaster reaction.
