Israel's Settlements: A Legal and Political Divide
Britain, France, and Canada announced this week their intention to advance a ban on trade with Israeli settlements, a move they claim is intended to protect the two-state solution. The article argues that these nations are correct in their premise, as Israel and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) do not constitute the same legal space. Israel itself maintains this distinction, having never annexed the West Bank, and Israeli law does not apply there as it does within sovereign Israel. While certain laws are applied personally to Israelis residing in the West Bank, this pertains to individuals, not the territory itself.
Thirty-three years after the signing of the first Oslo Accords, the agreement, despite being attacked, eroded, and declared defunct numerous times, has never been formally canceled by Israel. Oslo II divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C with varying degrees of Palestinian and Israeli authority, a structure that continues to organize security, administration, taxation, and relations with the Palestinian Authority. No Israeli government, including right-wing ones, has replaced this interim arrangement. The Oslo Accords transferred the daily governance of millions of Palestinians to the Palestinian Authority without annexing them to Israel or compromising Israeli security needs. While not achieving a final status agreement, they preserved the fundamental reality that Israel and the Palestinians are not a single political entity.
Israeli politics also reflects this separation, with various leaders proposing different frameworks, from a two-state horizon to Palestinian autonomy or a demilitarized Palestinian state. The article contends that the opposition to a Palestinian state is a veto, not a doctrine, and fails to define Israel's own outcome. Annexation with full citizenship would alter the Jewish state's demographic balance, while annexation without political equality would undermine its democracy. Permanent rule without annexation perpetuates friction between the Israeli military and the Palestinian population, empowering terrorism to shape Israel's future.
The author criticizes the avoidance of a decisive resolution, arguing it chooses permanent rule and allows adversaries to dictate outcomes. Security, defined as dismantling Hamas, demilitarizing Palestine, and establishing enforcement mechanisms, is presented as the condition, not ownership of all territory. Dividing the land is framed not as a concession to Europe or Palestinians, but as the means to preserve a Jewish, democratic, secure, and sovereign Israel without ruling another people.
Election promises of annexation have repeatedly failed to materialize, and the planned construction in E1, between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim, is unlikely to proceed despite repeated advancements. The article acknowledges that while the distinction between Israel and the settlements is valid, extending this distinction into a boycott of settlement residents is problematic. Living beyond the Green Line is not a crime, and residents of these communities, established and supported by Israeli governments, have rights that cannot be erased by a boycott. The economic impact of such boycotts is minimal, as exports from settlements constitute a fraction of Israel's total exports. Furthermore, most settlements function as bedroom communities, with the majority of their employed residents working outside the West Bank, and even a final status agreement would likely not necessitate the uprooting of most settlers.
